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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW· 
Thomas E. Bakert 
JUSTICIABILITY 
Any discussion of developments in constitutional law must be-
gin with the threshold "principle of first importance":l the article 
III limits on federal courts to consider and decide "cases and con-
troversies."2 The constitutional limits on the role of the federal ju-
diciary are three-dimensional. First, the judicial review power of 
the federal judiciary courts qua courts is limited to a consideration 
of "questions presented in an adversary context and in a form his-
torically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial pro-
cess."3 Second, the power of judicial review of the federal courts is 
also defined by '~the role assigned to t~e judiciary in a tripartite 
allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not in-
trude into areas committed to the other branches of government."· 
Third, the federal power of judicial review is restrained by the dy-
namics of the federal system itself and is self-restrained when the 
court declines to proceed or abstains though it has jurisdiction 
under the Constitution and the enabling statutes. II The power of 
judicial review of the federal courts is thus circumscribed along 
three axes: judicial tradition, separation of powers and federalism. 
During the survey period, the court charted its way along these 
• The author thanks Ms. Judy L. Coleman, J.D. 1981, Texas Tech University School of 
Law, for her research assistance. 
t An Assistant Professor of Law at Texas Tech University School of Law, the author 
obtained the B.S., cum laude, from Florida State University in 1974, and the J.D., with high 
honors, from the University of Florida, Holland Law Center in 1977. From 1977 to 1979 Mr. 
Baker served as a law clerk to the Honorable James C. Hill of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
1. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL· COURTS 17 (3d ed. 1976). See generally P. BATOR, D. 
SHAPIRO, P. MISHKIND, H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1·243 (2d ed. 1973). 
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See generally Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 
U.S. 227 (1937). 
3. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94·95 (1968). See text accompanying notes 7·63 infra. 
4. [d. See text accompanying notes 64·80 infra. 
5. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 218·36. See text accompanying notes 81·137 
infra. 
805 
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three contours of justiciability.s 
Standing and Mootness 
As a court qua court, the federal court must consider the 
threshold concerns of standing and mootness. "Standing" is the 
analytical facet of the justiciability doctrine which measures 
whether "a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable 
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy."7 The 
inquiry is focused on the individual, "on the party seeking to get 
his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he 
wishes to have adjudicated."s Conceding the correctness of Mr. 
Justice Douglas's caveat that "[g]eneralizations about standing to 
sue are largely worthless as such,"9 the Supreme Court has never-
theless divided standing into two basic inquiries. First, the court 
must determine "whether· the plaintiff alleges that the challenged 
action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise. "10 Sec-
ond, the court must determine "whether the interest sought to be 
protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of inter-
ests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question."ll 
The personal standing cases d.ecided during the survey period 
centered on the first principle of standing, the requirement of an 
injury in fact. The court concluded that the requisite injury in fact 
was present in two of three cases. In the first case parents and 
black children who had been among the original plaintiffs in a ten 
year old desegregation suit,12 and who had filed a motion to obtain 
additional relief deemed necessary to accomplish the previously or-
dered13 dismantling of racial discrimination, had standing. a, These 
plaintiffs possessed "such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens 
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends 
6. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 52-56 (1978). 
7. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). 
8. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (emphasis added). 
9. Association of Data Processing Service Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 
(1970). 
10. [d. at 152. 
11. [d. at 153. 
12. See Tasby v. Estes, 342 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Tex. 1971). 
13. See Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Tex. 1976). 
14. Tasby v. Estes, 643 F.2d 1103, 1105 (5th Cir. 1981). The plaintiffs lost on the mer-
its. [d. 
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for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."I!! More sig-
'nificantly, the plaintiffs would not be required to reestablish their 
standing each time they sought stich additional relief.16 In the sec-
ond case a husband had standing to seek federal declaratory and 
injunctive relief challenging a requirement of state community 
property law despite a subsequent legislative change which had the 
effect of abrogating the challenged rule.17 While" '[a] hypothetical 
threat is not enough,' "18 a challenger to a state practice need only 
establish "a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury from its 
application."19 The dispute was justiciable for the husband once he 
demonstrated that application of the abrogated common . law rule 
was "not an unrealistic possibility" due to the uncertain scope of 
the abrogating statute enacted during the pendency of the divorce 
proceedings.20 A third plaintiff, a former police officer, did not have 
personal standing to challenge department regulations which were 
not asserted as a basis for his own discharge.21 Since he had suf-
fered no injury in fact from the· challenged ·regulation which had 
not been applied to him, the former police officer's standing was 
not established by the mere existence of the regulations.22 Thus; in 
the personal standing cases the court seized on the injury in fact 
concept to assure requisite adverseness and personal interest which 
are central to a traditional judicial resolution. 
The general rule of representative standing is that "one to 
whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to 
attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might be taken 
as applying to other persons or other situations in which -its appli-
·cation might be unconstitutional."23 The nearly-swallowing excep-
tions to this rule often allow a third party standing to raise others' 
rights based on the factual significance of the relationship between 
the third party representative and those represented, the ability of 
15. [d. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962». 
16. [d. at 1105-06. 
17. Ziegler v. Ziegler, 632 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1980) .. 
18. [d. at 538 (quoting United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90 (1947». 
19. Ziegler v. Ziegler, 632 F.2d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 1980). 
20. [d. The plaintiff was denied immediate relief through application of the abstention 
doctrine. See text accompanying notes 110-137 infra. . 
21. Smith v. Price, 616 F.2d 1371, 1379-80 (5th Cir. 1980). The plaintiff lost on the 
merits of his wrongful discharge suit once the court concluded that he was constitutionally 
fired based on his involvement in gun play, his neglect of duties and failure to report the 
theft of his gun. [d. 
22. [d. 
23. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960). 
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the third party representative to provide the adverseness necessary 
for judicial resolution, and the likelihood that the rights of those 
not before the court will otherwise be lost.24 During the survey pe-
riod the court handed down a significant decision for the law of 
representative standing .. 
In Church of Scientology v. Cazares,25 the plaintiff Church 
sued the Mayor of Clearwater, Florida, under the Civil Rights 
Act,26 alleging that he had, under color of state law, deprived the 
Church of its civil rights by interfering with its right to free exer-
cise of religion.27 When it was announced that the plaintiff Church 
would be using a certain hotel as a training facility, the defendant 
Mayor became an outspoken critic of the Church. Plaintiff Church 
claimed interference with its free exercise right by the defendant 
Mayor's pattern of conduct which allegedly included making false 
and defamatory remarks which poisoned community sentiment, in-
ducing other community clergy to shun the Church, inducing mu-
nicipal and state officials to harass the Church, inducing civil orga~ 
nizations and community leaders to shun the Church, and inducing 
the local media to publish only inaccurate and adverse information 
about the Church.28 On appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court and held that the plaintiff had standing to protect the 
civil rights of its members.29 
The district court had reasoned that there were no rights in-
volved which could not be asserted by an individual member of the 
Church and no unusual circumstances were alleged which necessi-
tated representative standing.so The Fifth Circuit concluded this 
24. See Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423, 441 
(1974). See also generally Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Su-
preme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962). 
25. 638 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1981). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979). 
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." More accurately, the al-
leged violation was of the fourteenth amendment insofar all due process incorporates the 
free exercise clause. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). A second count of the 
complaint sounded in common law defamation and was grounded on diversity of citizenship. 
638 F.2d at 1275 n.2. 
28. 638 F.2d at 1276. 
29. [d. at 1278-80. Because the court held that the plaintiff Church had representative 
standing on behalf of its adherents, the issue of whether it could assert a corporate right to 
free exercise was reserved. [d. at 1280-81 n.7. The same issue was left unresolved by the en 
bane court in Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1977) (en 
bane). 
30. 638 F.2d at 1276. The district court also concluded that' the Civil Rights Act did 
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. was an unduly narrow approach to representative standing. First, 
Supreme Court precedents made clear that there is no requirement 
of "unusual circumstances" for a corporation to sue to protect the 
rights of its members, once it is recognized that the Qrganization 
and its members are identic and the organization itself likely will 
be adversely affected by the challenged action. SI Second, the fact 
that there were no rights which could not be asserted by individual 
members of the Church was deemed irrelevant so long as the 
Church met the standing criteria. S2 Third, consistent with prior 
Fifth Circuit precedent, it was not necessary that the complaint 
specifically state that the Church sought to represent its members, 
for it was obvious that such was the plaintiff Church's role. ss For 
an association to be allowed representative standing three elements 
must be satisfied: (1) the members themselves would have personal 
standing to sue; (2) the interests sought to be protected are ger-
mane to the very reason for the organization's existence; and (3) 
neither the claim the organization asserts nor the relief requested 
necessitates participation by individual members.s. Only the third 
element seemed to trouble the court. Recognizing that "a free exer-
cise claim is 'one that ordinarily requires individual participa-
tion,' "SII the court concluded that the third requirement was satis-
fied because the challenged activity affected the entire membership 
of the plaintiff Church in exactly the same way, and the Church 
was itself inhibited in its collective free exercise, including use of 
its property. S8 
not protect a corporation's free exercise right. Id. 
31. Id. at 1278. In 1958 the Supreme Court concluded that the NAACP had standing 
to resist exposure of the NAACP's state memoership lists. NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Pat-
terson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
32. 638 F.2d at 1277 (citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 
333, 342 (1977)). 
33. 638 F.2d at 1277-78. See also CORE v. Douglas, 318 F.2d 95, 102 (5th Cir. 1963). 
34. 638 F.2d at 1279. 
35. Id. at 1280 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 321 (1980)). 
36. 638 F.2d at 1280. The court thus distinguished Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 
(1980). The court emphasized that in Harris only an undetermined percentage of the organ-
ization's membership had a personal stake in the controversy. This seems to confuse the 
first requirement that members have personal standing with the third requirement that 
neither the claim nor the relief requested requires participation of individual members. The 
Supreme Court rejected representative standing in Harris because "participation of individ-
ual members ... [was) essential to a proper understanding and resolution of their free 
exercise claims." Id. at 321. In the instant case the court seemed to assert the plaintiff 
Church's own free exercise claim as a reason for allowing representative standing yet point-
edly declined to decide the general issue of institutional rights. 638 F.2d at 1280-81 n.7. See 
note 29 supra. 
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Other standing decisions during the sllrvey period further de-
fined the scope of representational standing by making marked 
distinctions between personal and representative standing.37 
In O'Hair u. Hill,38 famous atheist Madalyn Murray O'Hair39 
and the Society of Separationists, Inc., aimed a complex series of 
constitutional attacks at a provision of the Texas Constitution 
which guaranteed that no office holder would be excluded because 
of religious sentiments, as long as the officer acknowledged a per-
sonal theism.40 Neither O'Hair individually nor the Society repre-
sentatively alleged any kind of injury. A mere allegation that the 
provision was in violation of the establishment clause of the first 
amendment was deemed simply "inadequate."41 The court opined 
that both O'Hair personally and the Society representatively had 
standing to challenge the same provision under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment, because O'Hair had in 
fact been excluded and members of the Society would be subject to 
future exclusion from jury service":' Neither O'Hair nor the Soci-
ety had standing to enjoin the payment of salaries or the holding 
of further elections until the state constitutional provision was 
ruled unconstitutional. The charge that plaintiffs could be barred 
37. Three other decisions merit brief mention. Phillips v. Joint Leg. Comm., 637 F.2d 
1014, 1026 n.20 (5th Cir. 19S1) (class representatives who themselves had college degrees 
lacked standing to challenge an employer's educational r4!quirement of a college degree); 
Johns v. Department of Justice, 624 F.2d 522, 524 (5th Cir. 19S0) (neither couple with phys-
ical custody of child who allegedly was kidnapped nor natural mother sufficiently repre-
sented child's interest to have standing); Appling County v. Municipal Elec. Authority, 621 
F.2d 1301, 1307 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (19S0) (neither county nor its individ-
ual citizens and taxpayers had standing to represent unspecified good faith purchasers of 
county bonds). 
3S. 641 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 19S1). 
39. Ms. O'Hair first reached national prominence as a successful petitioner in the com-
panion case to School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), which held public school 
programs of voluntary Bible reading violated the establishment clause. 
40. TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 4 provides: "No religious test shall ever be required as a 
qualification to any office, or public trust, in this State; nor shall anyone be excluded from 
holding office on account of his religious sentiments, provided he acknowledge the existence 
of a Supreme Being." 
41. 641 F.2d at 310. 
42. [d. "People excluded from juries because of [unconstitutional reasons] are as much 
aggrieved as those indicted and tried under [such] a system .... Once the State chooses to 
provide . . . juries ... it must hew to ... constitutional criteria in ... the selection of 
membership .... " Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 3,29-30 (1970) (footnotes omitted). 
See also Ciudadanos Unidos De San Juan v. Hidalgo County Grand Jury Comm'rs, 622 F.2d 
S07, S15 (5th Cir. 19S0). O'Hair and the Society had standing to seek an injunction against 
any further seating of juries due to the unconstitutional refusal to allow them and other 
atheists to serve. The court, however, deemed abstention proper. 641 F.2d at 312-13. 
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from, or denied compensation for, public office was deemed en-
tirely too speculative absent some allegation of a desire or plan to 
seek such office.43 And since the Society would not itself suffer any 
injury in fact in regard to civil and criminal proceedings pending 
against O'Hair, there was simply no basis for allowing the Society 
represenative standing.44 
A second decision involving the doctrinal distinction between 
personal standing and representative standing included another fa-
mous personality. In Federal Election Commission v. Lance,4r> 
Lance resisted an administrative subpoena to appear and produce 
documents through a constitutional assault on the Federal Corrupt 
Practices Act.48 Lance attacked the entire Act as facially overbroad 
and invoked the principle that an administative subpoena will be 
judicially enforced only incident to " 'a lawfully authorized pur-
pose, within the power of Congress to command.' "47 If the Act is 
facially unconstitutional, Congress could not authorize its enforce-
ment by the agency.48 Treating the Act as severable, the en banc 
court concluded that 'Lance only had standing to challenge that 
part of the Act which may have been violated.49 The en banc court 
dispatched Lance's argument that his injury in fact under the par-
ticular portion qualified him to mount an attack on the entire Act. 
Lance was not seeking representative standing but rather argued 
the Act's overbreadth. The distinction is significant. A party claim-
ing representive standing alleges personal injury as well as injury 
43. 641 F.2d at 312. 
44. [d. at 310-12. The abstention doctrine played a significant role in the disposition of 
the appeal. See text accompanying notes 110-137 infra. 
45. 635 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). A three judge panel· concluded that the 
Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 437h(a), 441b (1976 & Supp. II 1979), required 
that since the appeal raised a constitutional issue it had to be submitted to the en banc 
court. FEC v. Lance, 617 F.2d 365, 37.4 (5th Cir. 1980). The en banc court agreed. FEC v. 
Lance. 635 F.2d 1132, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). See generally California Medical 
Ass'n v. FEC, 641 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1980). The investigation out of which the case arose 
involved Mr. T. Bertram Lance's efforts to win the governorship of Georgia, which came 
before he gained national prominence as a brief-tenured Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget under President Carter. . 
46. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976 & Supp. III 1979). This provision is now part of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.<;:. §§ 431-455 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See First Nat'l Bank 
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978). 
47. 635 F.2d at 1138 (quoting Oklahoma Press Publ. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 
(1946». 
48. 635 F.2d at 1139. Lance based his constitutional challenge on First Nat'l Bank v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
49. 635 F.2d at 1140. 
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to third persons whose rights ought to be considered.IIO By contrast, 
in a first amendment facial overbreadth challenge to a statute, the 
party claims that while a narrowly drawn statute could constitu-
tionally prohibit the conduct involved, the challenged statute fa-
tally includes constitutionally protected activity. In such a situa-
tion the party before the court has been injured in fact only by 
being denied a right to be prosecuted under a narrowly drawn stat-
ute. 111 Lance was not permitted to lay such a constitutional claim 
because of the severability and consequent narrowing of the Act 
and because the court was convinced that t4e raison d'etre of the 
overbreath doctrine, that the mere existence of the overbroad law 
will "chill" the exercise of third persons' rights, did not apply to 
the Act which specifically provided for a declaratory challenge to 
test its constitutionality. CI2 
The second doctrine which limits the judicial review power of 
the federal courts qua courts is mootness. In contrast to the stand-
ing inquiry, the mootness focus is on the sequence of events. 
Rooted at once in the article III "case or controversy" requirement 
and in classic notions of judicial self-restraint, the mootllless doc-
trine is based on a concern for the existence of the legal contro-
versy; in a moot case "there is no subject-matter on which the 
judgment of the court can operate. "118 During the period surveyed 
the court decided two significant appeals involving the doctrine of 
mootness. 
The plaintiff in Familias Unidas v. Briscoell4 was an unincor-
porated organization of Mexican-American students and adults 
formed to air grievances and seek reform of a Texas city's public 
schools. Having become frustrated by the response of the school 
officials, plaintiff's members took steps to boycott the schools. 
School officials responded by invoking a state statute to compel 
disclosure of the names of all the officers and members of the or-
50. See text accompanying note 34 supra. 
51. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 79-80 (1978) [hereinafter 
cited as CONSTITUTIONAL LAW). Ct. Smith v. Price, 616 F.2d 1371, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980). 
52. 2 U.S.C. § 437h (Supp. III 1979); 635 F.2d at 1141. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 
413 U.S. 601 (1973). The court also relied on the separation of powers notion that adminis-
trative subpoena proceedings be limited forums. See FTC v. Texaco, 555 F.2d 862, 873 (5th 
Cir. 1977). Lance lost on the merits of his narrowed claim. 635 F.2d at 1141-42. 
53. Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390 (1900). Of course, if a once substantial constitu-
tional claim becomes moot during the litigation, the federal court may still have pendent 
jurisdiction over a related statutory claim which remains valid. See Silva v. Vowell, 621 F.2d 
640 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 941 (1981). 
54. 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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ganization.55 When the county judge ordered the disclosure, the or-
ganization sued in federal court, seeking declaratory, injunctive 
and damage relief. Before any response was made to the disclosure 
order, the boycott ended and the county judge withdrew the disclo-
sure demand. Thereafter, school officials formally decided against 
future invocations of the disclosure statute. Still the plaintiff or-
ganization pressed for federal relief. The withdrawal of the disclo-
sure order and the assurance that no further requests would be 
made under the statute rendered the request for injunctive relief 
moot. "The test of mootness in a case for injunctive relief is 
whether the injury is continuing or is likely to be repeated. "58 Be-
cause the statute had been applied to the organization which alleg-
edly had suffered damage from lost membership and support, the 
underlying controversy was not moot. 51 
The second significant mootness decision during the survey 
period was Ciudadanos Unidos v. Hildalgo County.58 The plain-
tiffs filed civil actions seeking to establish that Mexican-Ameri-
cans, women, the young and the poor had been excluded from state 
grand juries unconstitutionally.59 The court concluded that the 
plaintiffs presented a live case or controversy even though selection 
of each grand jury list was a distinct act performed by an autono-
mous county commission.80 Allegations of a ten year pattern of dis-
crimination were not overcome with any showing on the part of 
defendants that there was "no reasonable expectation that the 
wrong will be repeated. "81 Because the selection scheme provided 
pronounced opportunities for continuing such alleged discrimina-
tions, the election of a successor key official and legislative amend-
ments did not moot the lawsuit.8s The court seemed preoccupied 
with preventing the defendants from "avoid[ing] suit by a mere 
temporary change of practice, after which they would be 'free to 
return to [their] old ways.' "83 
55. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 4.28 (Vernon 1972). 
56. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 454 F.2d 1333, 1334 
(5th Cir. 1971), quoted in Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 544 F.2d 182, 187 (5th Cir. 1976). 
57. 619 F.2d at 397-98. 
58. 622 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1479 (1981). 
59. [d. at 810. While the opinion blended standing and mootness, the real concern was 
the continued existence of the controversy. See id. at 815 n.17. 
60. [d. at 820-22. 
61. [d. at 825 (quoting United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953». 
62. 622 F.2d at 822-25. The legislative changes were deemed inconsequential to the 
issue of mootness. 
63. [d. at 825 (quoting United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953». 
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Advisory Opinions, Political Questions and Ripeness 
The principles which coalesce in the notion of separation of 
powers also provide threshold limits on the federal power of judi-
cial review.64 Three of these principles, the ban on advisory opin-
ions, the political question doctrine and the requirement of ripe-
ness, drew the attention of the court during the survey period. 
The most significant underpin'ning of the ban on advisory 
opinions is that their issuance would so enlarge the sphere of judi-
cial review that the separation of powers would be violated. Rely-
ing on the fundamental notion that "the federal courts do not de-
cide abstract, hypothetical, or contingent questions," the court 
refused to render an advisory opinion in Halder v. Standard Oil 
Co.61l Too hypothetical was a franchisee's concern that if the state 
condemned the' parcel of land involved, and if compensation in-
cluded payment for loss of business opportunity or good will, and 
if the franchisor did not fairly apportion the compensation, then 
the franchisee would be injured.66 The court declined to render an 
advisory opinion on "mere prediction."67 
The court applied the political question doctrine in disposing 
of the appeal in O'Hair v. Hill. 68 The plaintiffs challenged a provi-
sion of the Texas Constitution under the guaranty clause of the 
Constitution.6D The court simply invoked, the political question 
doctrine to dismiss the challenge, citing Luther v. Borden.70 This is 
curious because from 1849, when Luther v. Borden was decided, 
until now, the guaranty clause has been considered not to be "a 
repository of judicially manageable standards which a court could 
utilize independently in order to identify a state's lawful gov-
ernment.71 
The last-considered principle of justiciability, which rests on 
64. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Lance, 617 F.2d 365, 368-69 (5th Cir. 1980), 
submitted to en banc court, 635 F.2d 1132, 1136-38 (5th Cir. 1981) (limited role of the 
federal courts in administrative investigations). 
65. 642 F.2d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1981). 
66. [d. The franchisee sued under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act of 1978, 15 
U.S.C. § 2801-2841 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), which was a congressional effort to increase a 
petroleum industry franchisee's bllrgaining strength. 642 F.2d at 109-10. 
67. 642 F.2d at 109 n.l. Chief Judge Godbold specially concurred to emphasize the 
narrow holding of prematurity. [d. at 112. 
68. 641 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1981). 
69. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
70. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
71. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223 (1962). 
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the separation of powers in our federal government, is ripeness. 
The doctrine of ripeness is based on a concern for the fundamental 
"nature of the judicial process,"72 i.e., the institutional role of the 
federal judiciary.7s Somewhat analogous to mootness, which in-
volves a suit filed "too late," ripeness involves a case brought "too 
early."7. The ripeness doctrine is even more analogous to the ban 
on advisory opinions which prohibits abstract or hypothetical de-
claratory judgments; while the latter is retrospective in the sense 
that the requisite adversary case or controversy has failed to mate-
rialize, the ripeness doctrine is prospective in emphasizing that fu-
ture events might create or destroy the justiciability of the 
dispute.7& 
In Federal Election Commission v. Lance,78 the en banc court 
quoted the general rule for ripeness: "It must be a real and sub-
stantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of 
a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising 
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state· of facts. "77 Lance 
argued, inter alia, that the Federal Election Commission's investi-
gation of his 1974 election under statutory authority enacted in 
1975 and 1976 violated the ex post facto clause.78 The en banc ma-
jority. held that thiR argument was too uncertain and contingent on 
future events.79 The record had not matured to include an ad-
ministrative finding that no improprieties had occurred after the 
statutory enactments. Lance's own unsworn assertions that such 
were the facts did not place a court determination on firm judicial 
ground beyond thin speculation.80 
Eleventh Amendment and Abstention 
Federalism is the third major grouping of principles of jus-
ticiability which circumscribe the power of judicial review of the 
72. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 21.01, at 396 (3d ed. 1972). 
73. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 60. 
74. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 51, at 64. 
75. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 61. 
76. 635 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). See text accompanying notes 45-52 supra. 
77. [d. at 1138 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937», 
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
79. 635 F.2d at 1139. Four dissenting judges agreed with Lance on the ex post facto 
claim. 635 F.2d at 1143. (Coleman, C.J., dissenting). 
80. [d. at 1138-39. In addition the statutory penalties included criminal and civil sanc-
tions, the latter of which would be beyond the scope of the ex post facto clause. See Calder 
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall,) 386 (1798). 
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federal courts. In two principal areas, the interpretation of the 
eleventh amendment and the application of the abstention doc-
trines, the federal courts are restrained by the constitutional dy-
namics of the federal system itself and by principles of self-re-
straint inherent in the system.81 
The eleventh amendment82 does not act as a grant of immu-
nity to the states. The states are not exempted from the limits of 
federal law but are still suable for actions within its coverage only 
in state courts.8S While the eleventh amendment case law is well-
developed and quite complicated, five basic inquiries are inevitable 
in cases which raise an issue of coverage.8• The survey period saw a 
representative sample of cases. 
First, the amendment expressly bars suits by citizens of other 
states and foreign nationals and impliedly bars suits by citizens of 
the defendant state.811 Thus, a Wisconsin resident could not sue the 
State of Louisiana86 and a Texas plaintiff's suit against Texas 
would likewise be barred.87 Indeed, such "eleventh amendment 
rights of a state are sufficiently jurisdictional to be asserted for the 
first time on appeal. "88 
81. During the survey period the court reaffirmed related precepts which help demar-
cate federal and state court realms. "[Bjecause federal courts are courts of limited jurisdic-
tion, due regard for the constitutional allocation of powers between the state and federal 
systems requires a federal court scrupulously to confine itself to the jurisdiction conferred 
on it by Congress and permitted by the Constitution." In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1098 
(5th Cir. 1980). The wavering of the line is illustrated with one example. While the general 
rule has been that federal courts will decline jurisdiction over domestic relations, the federal 
courts have always reviewed constitutional issues which arise in a domestic context. Rowell 
v. Oesterle, 626 F.2d 437, 438 (5th Cir. 1980). There are, of course, also due process restric-
tions on the federal and state courts. See, e.g., Bankhead Enterprises, Inc. v. Norfolk & W. 
Ry., 642 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1981); Gold Kist, Inc. v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 623 F.2d 
375 (5th Cir. 1980); Southwest Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publ. Co., 622 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Sumrall v. Moody, 620 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1733 (1981). 
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XI was adopted in response to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 419 (1793). 
83. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 51, at 48. 
84. In resolving issues under the Eleventh Amendment we should ask five basic 
questions: (1) is the plaintiff one to whom the Amendment applies? (2) is the suit 
truly against the state? (3) is the suit seeking relief in a manner that is barred by the 
Amendment? (4) has the state waived its immunity? (5) is there a congressional stat-
ute which can override the immunity in this area? 
Id. at 50. . 
85. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
86. Dagnall v. Gegenheimer, 631 F.2d 1195, 1196 (5th Cir. 1980). 
87. Downing v. Williams, 624 F.2d 612, 625 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 
645 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1981). 
88. 631 F.2d at 1196. 
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Second, the suit must actually be against the state, that is, the 
state must be the real party in interest.89 The jurisdictional bar has 
been interpreted to also bar attempts at circumvention by suing a 
"governmental unit or individual, which stands in the shoes of the 
state."90 To make this determination "a court must examine the 
relationships and duties created by state law as to the institution 
or individual involved."91 In Downing v. Williams,92 whether a 
state mental health and mental retardation facility was a state in-
strumentality for eleventh amendment purposes was so complex an 
issue on which th~ parties had not been heard that the court re-
manded the issue to the district court.93. Suits against the private 
defendants in their individual capacity, however, were not deemed 
barred by the eleventh amendment despite the state's indemnity 
statute. The indemnity statute was deemed only an agreement be-
tween the state and the individuals. The court reasoned that to 
hold otherwise would always allow the state to claim immunity for 
individuals sued in their private capacity.94 
Third, the suit must seek relief in a manner which is barred by 
the eleventh amendment. At one time the bar was interpreted to 
prohibit "all suits in which plaintiffs sought to restrain or to com-
pel the action of state officials performing official duties imposed 
by constitutional state laws."9S Subsequent refinements of the doc-
I 
trine narrowed the bar to 
"suits 'by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be 
paid from public funds in the state treasury,' ... '[that are] the 
necessary result of compliance with decrees which by their terms 
[are] prospective in nature' at least ... where the very controversy 
is a result of our federal system."Be 
89. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). 
90. Downing v. Williams, 624 F.2d 612, 625 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 
415 U.S. 651 (1974) and In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887». 
91. Downing v. Williams, 624 F.2d 612, 626 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Hander v. San 
Jacinto Jr. College, 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975». . 
92. 624 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1980). 
93. Id. at 626. 
94. Id. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
95. Lummis v. White, 629 F.2d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Worcester County 
Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 296-300 (1937». 
96. Lummis v. White, 629 F.2d 397, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted) (quoting 
California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601, 616 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) wherein was quoted 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 667-68 (1974». In Lummis the court was guided by 
the views of four justices in concluding that Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 
292 (1937), had been eroded. 629 F.2d at 401-02. See text accompanying note 95 supra. 
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Thus, the eleventh amendment did not bar an administrator of an . 
estate, who was threatened with assessment and collection of death 
taxes by two states, from bringing a statutory interpleader action 
for a determination of the decedent's domicile.97 
Fourth, the state may waive its eleventh amendment protec-
tion. jrh~-waiver may be express as through Ii blanket. statute or in 
individual actions by an authorized officia1.98 Whether such a 
waiver is valid is a question of state law.99 When an attorney for a 
state agency had no authority under state law to waive the state's 
eleventh amendment protection, the bar could be raised even after 
the state had sought a favorable verdict and lost before the jury.100 
Even an implied waiver is possible.lol Indeed, the Fifth Circuit 
held in Familias Unidas v. Briscoel02 that "states may be consid-
ered to have waived their immunities and consented to such suits 
in federal court through their ratification of the fourteenth 
amendment. "103 
Finally, there may be a congressional statute which overrides 
the immunity.l04 For example, the states' immunity "must necessa-
rily be understood to have been modified by the dictates of the 
subsequently enacted Fourteenth Amendm.ent."loll Nevertheless, 
Congress must make it "unmistakably clear, either in statutory· 
language or in legislative history, that it purposefully intends to 
make the states amenable to private damages actions under the 
97. Lummis v. White, 629 F.2d 397, 402 (5th Cir. 1980). In a second case the costs of 
notice to class members was deemed so ancilliary to the prospective relief granted against 
the state as to be allowable under the eleventh amendment. Silva v. Vowell, 621 F.2d 640, 
652-54 (5th Cir. 1980). Although the court rejected the argument, it did entertain a curious 
cost/benefit argument in which the state urged that the expenses of such a notice were so 
excessive as to engage some sort of extraordinary protection under the eleventh amendment. 
98. Such a waiver must go beyond merely allowing suits in courts which otherwise 
have jurisdiction. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945). 
99. Id. 
100. Dagnall v. Gegenheimer, 631 F.2d 1195, 1196 (5th Cir. 1980). The court recog-
nized the inequitable scenario that had the state prevailed it would have claimed it had 
consented to the suit. Still, the state law and the eleventh amendment compelled such a 
result. Id. 
101. See Parden v. Terminal R.R., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri 
Bridge Comm'n 359 U.S. 275 (1959). 
102. 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980). 
103. Id. at 405 (citing Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp.; 600 F.2d 1070, 1078 (5th Cir. 
1979». 
104. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 51, at 53. See generally Field, The Eleventh 
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Corigressional Imposition of Suit 
upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1978). 
105. 619 F.2d at 405 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1975». 
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particular statute in question. "106 While the Civil Rights Act of 
1871107 was enacted to enforce the fourteenth amendment, the 
court in Familias Unidas held that neither the statutory language 
nor the legislative history satisfied the test. lOS Under this statute 
the state could not be held liable even for nominal damages. 109 
Federalism is' also the operative policy underlying the various 
abstention doctrines. The decisions of the Supreme Court have es-
tablished three general categories of abstention, and the Fifth Cir-
cuit decided appeals in each category during the survey period.110 
The original abstention case which gave its name to the first 
category was Railroad Commission v. Pullman CO.lll There the 
plaintiff railroad company challenged an order of the state railroad 
commission, claiming that the order was unauthorized under state 
law and violated the Federal Constitution. Since it did not have to 
reach the constitutional issue of whether the order was beyond the 
commission's authority, the Supreme Court withheld decision 
pending a state court proceeding which would construe the state 
law.ll2 Two requirements must be satisfied for a Pullman absten-
tion: (1) a central issue of state law involved must be unsettled, 
and (2) there must be a likelihood that one possible determination 
of the state law issue would obviate the decision of a federal con-
stitutional issue in the case.ll8 
The court agreed that Pullman abstention was appropriate in 
two cases decided during the survey period. In the first, Palmer v. 
Jackson,114 a group of attorneys brought an action challenging a 
one-time fee assessment imposed on attorneys in the state to pay 
106. 619 F.2d at 405 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672·73 (1974». 
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979). 
108. 619 F.2d at 405 (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 339 (1979) and Alabamav. 
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978». 
109. 619 F.2d at 405. 
110. Perhaps significant and worth noting is that during the survey period the court 
did not apply two other related categories of abstention. Despite its crushing docket the 
court did. not abstain merely to serve its own convenience. See WRIGHT, supra note I, at 227. 
A fifth category of abstention, which fallows the federal court to stay its hand in private 
diversity litigation to avoid having to decide difficult questions of state law, was also not 
used during the survey period. United Services, Inc. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 
1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1965). 
111. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See generally Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: 
The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (1974). 
112. 312 U.S. at 501·02. 
113. Palmer v. Jackson, 617 F.2d 424, 428 (5th Cir. 1980). 
114. Id. 
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for a new state bar building, under multiple provisions of state law 
and the Federal Constitution. lltl The shotgun backfired when the 
court concluded that the unresolved and unclear issues of state law 
they raised fulfilled the first requirement of Pullman abstention. liS 
The plaintiffs admitted that their suit raised numerous unsettled 
issues of state law. Nevertheless, they urged nonabstention because 
the state court which would decide the unsettled state law issues 
was a party to the litigation. Thus, there was no state forum which 
could impartially adjudicate the state law issues. The court re-
jected this argument on the basis of state case law which made 
clear that the state's courts often reviewed court-adopted rules in 
light of constitutional and statutory measures. ll7 The prior admin-
istrative involvement of the state supreme court was deemed insuf-
ficient to prevent the state court from performing its role in devel-
oping state law.ll8 The second requirement of Pullman abstention 
was also satisfied. Plaintiffs' challenges on the special assessment 
under the due process and equal protection clauses would be ren-
dered moot by a determination that the assessment was unautho-
rized or illegal under state law.ll8 Therefore, abstention was 
proper.12O Consistent with the procedure of abstention generally, 
the plaintiffs would be free to sue in state court and raise all their 
state law and constitutional law issues, or expressly reserve the 
federal issues for federal court resolution after the state court 
proceedings.121 
In Ziegler v. Ziegler,122 the court was faced with a state statute 
which had not been construed by the state courts and was amena-
115. [d. at 427·28. 
116. Unsettled issues of state law included (1) the validity of the encumbrance on 
state property; (2) the legality of the fee assessment; (3) whether failure to pay the assess-
ment would result in disbarment; and (4) whether the bar's arrangement complied with the 
state constitution and applicable bar regulations. [d. at 428-29. 
117. [d. at 429-30. See Cameron v. Greenhill, 582 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. 1979). 
118. 617 F.2d at 430. 
119. The plaintiffs' first amendment free association challenge to compulsory bar 
membership would also be either avoided or materially changed. [d. at 431. See Harrison v. 
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959). It was not a valid basis for refusing abstention, in part, 
because the merits appeared foreclosed by Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961) (plural-
ity opinion). 
120. While the general procedure is for the federal court to stay further action but 
retain jurisdiction, because of a wrinkle in the Texas Declaratory Judgment Law, the case 
was properly dismissed without prejudice. 617 F.2d at 431 n.11. See Harris County Comm'rs 
Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77 (1975). 
121. 617 F.2d at 432 (citing England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 
U.S. 411 (1964». 
122. 632 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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ble to one constitutional construction, with a second construction 
which would raise serious constitutional issues. Seeking to avoid 
the peculiar situation of considering whether the statute was un-
constitutional under the second construction when the state courts 
could later give it the first constitutional construction, the court 
concluded abstention was appropriate.123 Such a postponement of 
federal jurisdiction, especially in the area of domestic relations law 
involved in the case, would avoid "unnecessary constitutional deci-
sions and ... promot[e] harmonious federal-state relations."124 
One final factor swept into the calculus. The argument for Pull-
man abstention was made even more compelling by the existence 
of a state action pending which was likely to resolve the state law 
issues. The delay factor of commencing another state court pro-
ceeding, itself a factor often militating against abstention, was thus 
minimized. l2II 
In a third appeal the court affirmed the district court's decli-
nation to abstain.12s The Pullman abstention requirements were 
not satisfied in the class action to challenge the constitutionality of 
the Mississippi procedures for civil commitment. The federalism-
based reluctance to inject an unnecessary constitutional ruling into 
an area of unsettled state law was absent. l27 The first element of 
Pullman abstention was not present since the state statutory pro-
visions were not ambiguous and their operation in practice was 
clear.12S 
The second type of abstention takes its name from Burford v. 
Sun Oil CO.129 The Supreme Court in Burford held that the federal 
court should have dismissed the suit because the issues revolved 
around a highly specialized and complicated state regulatory sys-
tem.180 Burford abstention is now required when "there have been 
presented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy 
problems of substantial public import whose importance tran-
scends the result in the case then at bar."181 In Appling County v. 
123. [d. at 538-39. 
124. [d. at 539. 
125. [d. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). 
126. Chancery Clerk v. Wallace, 646 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1981). 
127. [d. at 155. 
128. [d. 
129. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
130. [d. 
131. Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976). 
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Municipal Electric Authority,132 the county and its citizens and 
taxpayers brought suit against the owners of a nuclear power plant 
to collect additional ad valorem taxes. The Fifth Circuit affirmed 
in a single sentence opinion the holding of the district court that 
the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over the relationships 
involved.133 
Of the third category of abstention, on,e prominent federal 
court expert has observed: "There is no more controversial, or 
more quickly changing, doctrine in the ftederal courts today 
•••• "IM Often referred to as "Our Federalism," the doctrine is 
identified with the Supreme Court's decision in Younger v. Har-
ris. 131i The basic notion of Younger abstention is that a federal 
court will stay its hand where "absent bad faith, harassment"or a 
patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction has been invoked 
for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings. "136 In 
each of three cases in which the Younger abstention doctrine was 
invoked, the court declined to apply it. In all three cases the rea-
son was the same: the threshold requirement of a pending state 
proceeding was not satisfied so there was no referent for federal 
deference.137 ' 
COMMERCE CLAUSE 
During the survey period .the court had occasion to apply gen-
eral notions of the commerce clause power. In Scott v. Moore/ 3s a 
construction company and two of its employees sued two unions 
and individual union members, alleging that the defendants had 
conspired to deprive plaintiffs of equal protection and their privi-
leges and immunities by planning and executing' an attack on 
plaintiffs' construction site. The' defendants argued that, even if 
132. 621 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980). 
133. [d. at 1302. 
134. WRIGHT, supra note I, at 229. 
135. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
136. Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 (1976). 
For a detailed exposition of this volatile doctrine see generally 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4251-4255, at 533-87 (1978). 
137. Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599, 601-02 (5th Cir. 1981); Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City 
of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029, 1037 (5th Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3863 (1980); 
Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir.), appeal docketed, 49 U.S.L.W. 
3467 (1980). But see Fitzgerald v. Peek, 636 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1981). 
138. 640 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1861189 was intended to provide a civil 
remedy for a wholly private conspiracy of the kind alleged, Con-
gress lacked the power to enact legislation of such breadth. The 
court held that the commerce clause empowered Congress to reach 
the defendants' conduct.140 
During the survey period the court thrice wrestled with the so-
called "dormant" commerce clause which requires a judicial deter-
mination of the extent of permissible state regulation of interstate 
commerce in the absence of federal legislation. Because the com-
merce clause is an affirmative grant of power to Congress, the doc-
trine developed to limit state interference with interstate com-
merce. It is based on "negative implications," i.e., by interpreting 
what Mr. Justice Jackson called the "great silences of the Consti-
tution. "141 Thus, the federal judicial role in confining economic lo-
calism is directly implicated by the rationale of the commerce 
clause "to create and foster a common market among the 
states. "142 
In Louisiana Dairy Stabilization Board v. Dairy Fresh 
Corp.,148 the plaintiff Board appealed from a judgment invalidating 
a state regulation insofar as it affected dairy products processed, 
sold and delivered out-of-state by nonresident processors. 1 .. In 
1974 Louisiana enacted the Dairy Stabilization Law which itself 
made no distinction between in-state and out-of-state proces-
sors.1U Passed as a comprehensive regulation of the dairy industry 
to protect producers, processors and distributors, the legislation 
sought to ensure against price wars, unfair competition and disrup-
tive trade practices through a comprehensive scheme of licensing. 
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976). 
140. 640 F.2d at 724. The court avoided the plaintiffs' suggested fourteenth amend-
ment basis as "fraught with uncertainty." [d. at 725. Equally unsupportable on the record 
were the two sources of power relied on in a leading Supreme Court case, the thirteenth 
amendment and the right to travel. [d. at 724-25. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 
(1971). 
141. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). In contrast the 
states are expressly forbidden to interfere with foreign commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 
2. 
142. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 51, at 244. See Service Machine & Shipbuilding 
Corp. v. Edwards, 617 F.2d 70, 73 (5th Cir. 1980). 
143. 631 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1980). 
144. The Board had sought a declaratory judgment pertaining to its powers to regulate 
two nonresident companies. The defendant companies won a counterclaim based on the 
commerce clause. Louisiana Dairy Stabilization Bd. v. Dairy Fresh Corp., 476 F. Supp. 416 
(M.D. La. 1979). 
145. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:931.1-.19 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981). 
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and regulation.u8 The district court found that the defendants 
completed the processing of the products sold to Louisiana retail-
ers in states other than Louisiana and that the sale and delivery of 
the products took place outside the state. The products were then 
imported and resold in the state by the retailer.147 The Board con-
tended that the defendant processors had to be licensed which in-
volved a three cents per hundredweight assessment and a detailed 
set of requirements covering record keeping, payment and credit 
arrangements, delivery methods, and sales techniques.u8 The 
Board's effort to regulate these defendants in such a manner was 
held to violate the commerce clause, under the basic rule that a 
statutory purpose or effect which seeks to insulate state producers 
from competitive interstate commerce unreasonably burdens the 
flow of interstate comm~rce.149 In response to the Board's conten-
tion that it did not fix prices but only imposed the assessment and 
other requirements as incidents of its antitJ'ust efforts, the court 
invoked the seminal Supreme Court decision in Baldwin u. G.A.F. 
Seelig, Inc.,tGO which held invalid a New York effort to fix mini-
mum dairy prices. While the state had the power to regulate inter-
state activities to protect producers, processors and distributors, it 
could not project its regulation beyond its borders. Louisiana's in-
vocation of the antitrust talisman was deemed no more significant 
than was New York's effort in Baldwin to enforce dairy regulations 
purposed to protect public health and safety.Ul The court followed 
the teachings of Baldwin in rejecting the antitrust distinction, for 
the argument would prove too much in that it would justify virtu-
146. See 631 F.2d at 68. 
147. Under previous legislation the Louisiana Milk Commission, which preceded the 
Board, sought to set retail prices. A supermarket retailer, recognized as something of a New 
Orleans institution, sought to circumvent the regulation by purchasing dairy products 
processed out-of-state for importation into and resale in Louisiana. See Schwegmann Bros. 
Giant Supermarkets v. Louisiana Milk Comm'n, 365 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. La. 1973) (three-
judge court), aff'd, 416' U.S. 922 (1974). After Schwegmann successfully challenged the ap-
plication of the regulation to such an arrangement on the basis of the commerce clause, the 
deal was struck with the defendants in the instant case. Louisiana Dairy Stabilization Bd. v. 
Dairy Fresh Corp., 476 F. Supp. 416, 418 (M.D. La. 1979). Extensive litigation with the state 
health agency ended in an order to permit the importation and resale. Schwegmann Bros. 
Giant Supermarkets v. Edwards, 323 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 326 So. 2d 
503 (La. 1976). In 1976 Louisiana abolished the Commission and created the Board that was 
given broad regulatory powers which did not include fixing prices. 
148. 631 F.2d at 68. 
149. [d. at 69. 
150. 294 U.S. 511 (1935). See also H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). 
151. 631 F.2d at 69. The fact that the Louisiana scheme did not set prices was not 
deemed a reason for not applying the Baldwin rule. [d. 
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ally all trade barriers erected against incoming commerce. 1112 
The issue in Smith v. Department of Agriculture l1l3 was 
whether a farmers' market was an economist's market. The State 
of Georgia operated a farmers' market at which those with state 
licenses could rent space to sell their produce. Certain locations 
were more desirable because they provided better protection from 
the elements, superior produce displays, and greater accessibility. 
The plaintiff, a resident of Alabama, had sold produce at the mar-
ket for twenty years. Booth assignments were made irrespective of 
residency until 1973 when the Georgia Department of Agriculture 
adopted a rule 'of assignment based solely on state residency, with 
the avowed purpose of providing a competitive advantage for 
Georgia farmers. The majority framed the threshold issue to be 
whether Georgia was acting in a proprietary or a regulatory capac-
ity, distilling a distinction from recent Supreme Court decisions 
between the state as a market participant and as a market regula-
tor.1M The majority concluded that Georgia was acting as a market 
regulator which then subjected the residency regulation to com-
merce clause scrutiny.lIiIi Under traditional commerce clause analy-
sis the regulation was found wanting. lIi8 The dissenting judge was 
convinced that the state was operating in a proprietary role in the 
market for booths and not the market for produce.11I7 Booth assign-
ment thus was not regulation of a market in produce or in booths, 
but merely the state's participation in the farmers' market or 
booth business. As a proprietor, the dissent reasoned, the state 
152. But cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (legitimate state purpose may 
be served with least restrictive means when intrastate benefit outweighs interstate burden). 
153. 630 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980). 
154. ld. at 1083. 
155. ld. 
156. Given the avowed purpose of protecting in-state farmers, the state's burden was 
"virtually insurmountable." ld. at 1084. The three-pronged inquiry considers: 
(1) whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with only "incidental" 
effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce either 
on its face or in practical effect; 
(2) whether the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and, if so, 
(3) whether alternative means could promote this local purpose as well without dis-
criminating against interstate commerce. 
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979), quoted in 630 F.2d at 1084. The party chal-
lenging the statute must demonstrate discrimination against interstate commerce. Once that 
burden is satisfied, the state must justify the discrimination by showing the effectiveness of 
the statute and the absence of nondiscriminatory means to serve the local interest. See 441 
U.S. at 336. 
157. 630 F.2d at 1088 (Randall, J'., dissenting). See also id. at 1086 (Gee, J., 
concurring). 
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could deal in its booths· almost as it liked without violating the 
commerce clause. 1118 
The third dormant commerce clause decision, Service Ma-
chine & Shipbuilding Corp./&9 held a worker registration ordi-
nance invalid under the commerce clause.16o Because the ordinance 
required registration of nonresident applicants seeking their first 
job and did not require registration of similar resident applicants, 
the ordinance discriminated against interstate commerce in favor 
of local residents.16l While crime control was deemed a legitimate 
local purpose,162 such a scheme was not justified as an efficient or 
the most efficient means of serving that local purpose since a 
scheme requiring all first time applicants would be more efficient 
and not discriminatory.16a Under the lesser standard applicable/6• 
balancing the perceived benefits against the burdens on commerce, 
the 'ordinance fell under its own weight. The putative benefits in-
cluded deterring criminals from relocating in the parish and facili-
tating apprehension of those undeterred. The many impediments 
to personal mobility as an incident of interstate commerce in-
cluded highly detailed revelations of personal information and a 
158. Id. at 1088 (Randall, J., dissenting); id. at 1086 (Gee, J., concurring). 
159. 617 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1980). The focus was on the dormant commerce clause since 
Congress had not exercised its power to preempt the area of crime control. Even in this area 
Congress has exercised some commerce clause power. See, e.g., Perez v. United States,402 
U.S. 146 (1971). 
160. The commerce clause goes beyond state statutes to reach local ordinances. 617 
F.2d at 73 (citing Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)). 
161. Registration was a detailed and cumbersome procedure imposed .on employers of 
itinerant laborers, defined as those who traveled into the parish seeking employment and 
residents of the parish who sought to change employment. 617 F.2d at 72. Registration in-
cluded fingerprinting, photographing the subject, disclosure of personal information and 
payment of a fee. Id. at 71-72 n.2. 
162. Id. at 74. The parish had concluded that rapid population growth and a large 
influx of industry with an immigration of transient laborer:, had boosted the local crime 
rate. Id. at 71.· 
163. Id. at 75 . 
. 164. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), described the balancing as 
follows: 
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public in-
terest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld 
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found then the question be-
comes one of degree. And the extent of that burden that will be tolerated will of 
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be 
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. 
Id. at 142 (citation omitted). City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). The 
second analysis differs from the first analysis only in that the former defers more to local 
interest by not assuming a discrimination against interstate commerce. 
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fee which disproportionately burdened the poor laborer and the 
employer with numerous employees. The court was convinced that 
a less intrusive scheme was possible. 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Ever since substantive due process has been characterized by 
near complete judicial deference to the legislative process, statutes 
have been upheld for "virtually no substantive reason at all . . . 
except where constitutional provisions much more explicit than 
due process were in jeopardy.m611 While the standard may have 
some content, its application has been substanceless due process. 
No citation of authority is necessary; the bold black letter corollary 
to the constitutional standard has been that when a substantive 
due process argument is raised, the court will defer' to the judg-' 
ment of the state legislature166 and Congress.167 Although the sur-
veyed term generally followed this corollary, there were a few nota-
ble exceptions. 
In a series of rather routine substantive due process. decisions, 
the court upheld the following acts as rational: the imposition of a 
strict liability, civil monetary penalty under the 1972 amendments 
to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act168 upon the owner of a 
facility which discharged gasoline into navigable waters, even 
though the discharge resulted solely from the' acts of an unknown 
third person;169 application of the Mississippi Business Sign Stat-
ute170 which authorized creditors of an improperly disclosed princi-
pal or partner to execute and sell business property used to trans-
act business;l7l the application of the 197-2 amendments to the 
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,l7! ex-
165. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 450-51 (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 373 U.S. 726 (1963». 
166. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See, e.g., Bruneau's, Inc. v. Nichols, 642 F.2d 146 (5th 
Cir. 1981); Anderson v. Winter, 631 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1981); Oster v. City of New Orleans, 
631 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980); Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 625 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Davidson v. Georgia, 622 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1980). 
167. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See, e.g, United States v. Coastal States Crude Gathering 
Co., 643 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1981); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Marshall; 634 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 
1981). 
168. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 2, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 
(1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
169. United States v. Coastal States Crude Gathering Co., 643 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 
1981). 
170. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 15-3-7 (1972). 
171. Bruneau's, Inc. v. Nichols, 642 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1981). 
172. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, § 
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tending employee benefits coverage to deaths causally unrelated to 
previous maritime injury, to impose liability on an insurance car-
rier covering the employer at the time of a preamendment in-
jury;173 the Mississippi dual retirement system for state employees 
so far as it provided greater benefits for officers of the State High-
way Safety Patrol than for agents of the State Bureau of Narcot-
ics;174 a New Orleans ordinance, governing licensing and operation 
of massage parlors, which detailed recorc,lkeeping requirements, 
hours of business, administrative inspectioI1S and coverage exemp-
tions;1711 application of a local ,Mississippi school board rule which 
mandated automatic expulsion of any student who brought a 
weapon to school;176 and the procedures for administering the 
Georgia Bar Examination.177 More intriguing are the two decisions 
in which the court declared legislation invalid under the due pro-
cess clause. 
In Harper u. Lindsay,178 the court handled a complex due 
process challenge to a comprehensive set of county regulations for 
massage parlors.179 The court gave short shrift to plaintiffs' argu-
ments that the pursuit of a legitimate business was a fundamental 
right and thus required a compelling state interest to justify its 
regulation. Such a theory of strict scrutiny was seen as nothing 
more than an attempt to resurrect the lon~~-discredited concept of 
substantive due process and violated the "well established rule 
that state regulations of business or industry are to be reviewed 
under the less exacting 'rational basis' stan(jard.mso The court eas-
5, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976 &' Supp. III 1979). 
173. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 634 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1981). Such retrospective 
legislation, although not favored, is not per se unconstitutional. Id. at 846 (citing Stephens 
v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445.(1899), and Blount v. Windley, 95 U.S. 173 (1877». Its 
retroactive quality subjected the legislation to a somewhat heightened level of scrutiny. See 
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. I, 17 (1976). 
,174. Anderson v. Winter, 631 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980). 
175. Oster v. City of New Orleans, 631 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1981). See also text accompa-
nying notes 178-184 infra. 
176. Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 625 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1980). 
177. Davidson v. Georgia, 622 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1980). 
178. 616 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1980). 
179. The regulations were adopted pursuant to a Texas legislative authorization. TEx. 
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2372v, § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 198()-1981). The scope of the legisla-
tive delegation was considered to include such regulations. Il16 F.2d at 852-54. Neither party 
appealed the district court's holding that the ordinance banning heterosexual massage was 
beyond the legislative delegation. Id. at 853. See Harper v. Lindsay, 454 F. Supp. 597, 607-
09 (S.D. Tex. 1978). 
180. 616 F.2d at 854 (quoting Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002, 1012 (5th Cir. 1978». 
Contra, Corey v. City of Dallas, 352 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Tex. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 
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ily conceived of a rational relation between the identified, actuaPSI 
purpose of the ordinance, as an exercise of the police power to pro-
tect community health, welfare and morals by controlling massage 
parlors, and each particularls2 regulation. ls3 Regulations requiring 
proof of identification and records of patrons' comings and goings 
would prevent minors from patronizing such establishments and 
inhibit adult patrons from soliciting illicit sex. The requirement 
that masseurs and masseuses wear white clothing served ends of 
health and sanitation. Various provisions applying to entrances, 
exits and locks would allow for administrative inspections, discour-
age illicit behavior and aid fire escape. Regulations of hours and 
outside premises would maintain neighborhood character. The reg-
ulation requiring a six-inch by six-inch unobstructed opening on 
all interior doors, however, was found arbitrary and unreasonable 
and hence unconstitutional. The provision did not secure free pas-
sage, facilitate fire escape or protect against foul play. The court 
could conceive of no rational justification of this requirement. Sug-
gesting that patrons were entitled to a "reasonable amount of pri-
vacy," the court concluded that the requirements served no valid 
state interest. IS,. 
The second recognized substantive due process denial came in 
Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite/s" which involved the 
fundamental right to play "Space Invaders."ls6 The plaintiff owned 
and operated a chain of family amusement centers and sought to 
open a center in the defendant city. The defendant city had en-
acted an ordinance prohibiting children under the age of seventeen 
from playing coin-operated games unless accompanied by a parent 
or legal guardian.1s7 The court reversed the district court188 and 
492 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally McCloskey, Economic Due Process and The 
Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34. 
181. See 616 F.2d at 869 (Vance, J., concurring). But see Williamson v. Lee Optical 
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
182. See 616 F.2d at 869 (Vance, Jr., concurring). 
183. [d. at 855-57. The court depended in large measure on its prior opinion in Pollard 
v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1978), which upheld a very similar ordinance. 
184. 616 F.2d at 855. The majority used the privacy concern to support an irrational-
ity conclusion. [d. Judge Vance, concurring, concluded the same regulation was unconstitu-
tional for failing a strict scrutiny engaged by the ordinance's abridgement of the patrons' 
fundamental right of privacy. [d. at 869. 
185. 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980). 
186. "Space Invaders" is a type of trademarked, electronic, coin-operated game. Of 
course, the broader issue was whether playing such games is a fundamental right. 
187. The ordinance was actually reenacted after the city leaders changed their minds 
about repealing an earlier version because of a concern that plaintiff had connections with 
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held that the ordinance violated the due process clause.189 Initially 
assuming that the rational basis test was the appropriate standard, 
the court first identified two legitimate public purposes within the 
contemplation of the police power: the prevention of truancy and 
exposure to corrupting influences. Second, the court analyzed the 
under-seventeen ban to determine whether this regulation ration-
ally served these two legitimate purposes. The absolute ban on all 
persons under seventeen including those not obliged to attend 
schooP90 was held to be "patently irrational."19l Therefore, the or-
dinance satisfied the test for irrationality: " 'patently 'useless in the 
service of any goal apart from whim or favoritism.' "192 The com-
plete bar included after school hours. and non school days. The 
court was convinced that the community leaders' disapproval of 
such activities was so served but not the interest in preventing tru-
ancy.193 The record was "entirely devoid of evidence" that persons 
under seventeen years of age were exposed to corrupt influences at 
such establishments.194 The defendant city thus had failed to 
demonstrate any particular need for the absolute ban. The court 
reasoned that corrupt individuals were drawn to such amusement 
centers not by the machines but by the gathering of potential 
young victims. The ordinance would not prevent exposure to cor-
rupting influences since they would follow the youthsto other con-
gregating sites. Only a complete ban on all youthful congregation 
would frustrate the undesirables' efforts at youth corruption. 
organized crime. The dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant city are detailed in' 
the court's. opinion. [d. at 1032-35. The court suggested that "there are limits on the powers 
of 'municipalities to induce businessmen to expend vast sums of money, then, without any 
changed circumstances, to enact legislation which destroys the value of that expenditure." 
[d. at 1044. The court concluded with an erudite discourse on the role of government vis-a-
vis individual autonomy which reads like a constitutional sermon to government officials on 
"the right to be let alone- the most comprehensive of rightll and the right most valued by 
civilized men." [d. at 1046 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438; 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting». 
188. See Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 434 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Tex. 1977). 
189. The court concluded that due process was denied under the United States and 
Texas Constitutions. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; TEX. CON ST. art. I, § 19. The analysis was the 
same under both. 630 F.2d at 1039-40 n.14. 
190. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.032-.033 (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1980). 
191. 630 F.2d at 1039. 
192. [d. (quoting Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with'Ra-
tionality Review? 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 499 (1979». 
193: This analysis is somewhat analogous to the requirement of least restrictive means 
to effect a legitimate purpose which applies to fundamental rights. See Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). 
194.630 F.2d at 1040. 
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The court continued that "[e]ven if the challenged ordinance 
had a rational basis and a legitimate purpose, we would neverthe-
less be compelled to strike it down."19& A right of association in 
such a social context as was involved in the case, among the youths . 
themselves and not between malefactor and youth, was distilled 
from Supreme Court196 and Fifth Circuit precedent.197 Although 
ihe ordinance was aimed at "nonassociational evils," because it af-
fected a fundamental right, the ordinance would have had to serve . 
a compelling state interest by the narrowest means which mini;,. 
mized the interference with the protected activity.198 The court 
recognized a legitimate state interest in protecting youths from. 
"unhealthy influences" even by regulating constitutionally pro-
tected conduct.199 The broader state interest in protecting chil-
dren, however, applies only when the "special circumstance of 
youth creates a unique danger to minors which presents the state 
with an interest in regulating their activities that does not exist in 
the case of adults."20o Three reasons mandating such a state inter-. 
est were identified: (1) the peculiar vulnerability of children; (2) 
the inability of children- to exercise mature judgment in a critical 
decision; and (3) the importance of preserving the parental role in 
child-rearing.201 As tothe first reason there was no peculiar vulner-
ability, in the sense of a physical, mental or moral threat, 
presented by coin-operated amusement. To merely suggest that 
minors were free to express their views in school on controversial 
public issues202 and to secure abortions without parental consent203 
but not free to decide whether to drop a quarter in a slot was 
enough for the court to overcome the second reason. The third rea-
son worked against the ordinance because such a decision was for 
parents, and parents who allowed their children coin-operated 
195. Id. at 1041. 
196. Id. (citing Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974), wherein was 
quoted Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas J., dissenting». 
197. 630 F.2d at 1042 (citing Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1980) and 
Robinson v. Reed, 566 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1978». 
198. Having concluded that the ordinance was without a rational basis the outcome 
under the strict scrutiny test was preordained. See text accompanying notes 190-194 supra. 
199. 630 F.2d at 1042. That children's rights were involved did not alone diminish the 
constitutional protection involved. Rather, the state's interest was heightened. See generally 
Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1156, 1358-
77 (1980). 
200. 630 F.2d at 1042. 
201. Id. at 1043 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (plurality opinion». 
202. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
203. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
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amusement were burdened by the accompaniment provision. There 
was therefore no compelling state interest to justify the ordinance's 
interference in youths' free association.204 The ordinance also 
swept too broadly, for children could be shielded from undesirable 
influences by less drastic means such as criminalizing the illicit 
conduct and its solicitation.2011 Substantive due process was denied. 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
Survey decisions in procedural due process tracked familiar 
paths. Several particular applications, however, are worth noting 
here. Government, state or federal, may not deprive "any person of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law."206 Procedural 
due process simply is fair procedure, i.e., what "process" is "due." 
Unlike substantive due process and other substantive constitu-
tional guarantees, the judicial evaluation focuses on the decision-
making process wholly apart from the fairness of the underlying 
rule being applied. The procedural due process protection has two 
components. The court must first determine when government has 
deprived an individual of "life, liberty or property," and, second, 
determine whether the process afforded in the deprivation was 
adequate. 
A person's "liberty" includes the full range of activity and au-
tonomy afforded constitutional protection. "[T]o determine 
whether due process requirements apply in the first place ... [the 
court] must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the inter-
est at stake . . . to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth 
Amendment's protection."207 The nature of the interest is the com-
plete creation of the state. Because a state practice, regulation, rule 
or statute is unlikely to label the interest "liberty," the court must 
further focus on the substances of the state action. During the sur-
vey period the court concentrated on several examples. A plaintiff's 
allegation that his daughter and son-in-law secured his involuntary 
commitment at a mental hospital implicated a liberty interest in 
freedom from physical restraint.208 A teacher may have· a liberty 
204. 630 F.2d at 1042-44. 
205. [d. at 1042. 
206. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1. 
207. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 
841 (1977) (emphasis in original) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 
(1972)). 
208. Dahl v. Akin, 630 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1977 
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interest in his standing in the community and in being free from 
the stigma or disability caused by a school board's public criticism 
and false information contained in a reprimand letter.209 A parent's 
liberty interest in family integrity and autonomy was recognized in 
a child dependency proceeding which would transfer custody to 
the state until terminated by the court or the child reached the age 
of eighteen.2lO Even in an environment of diminished liberty, visi-
tation rights once given to convicted prisoners could not be with-
held as punishment without procedural due process, and pretrial 
detainees had a liberty interest in guaranteed reasonable visitation 
privileges.211 Likewise, once a state created a parole system for its 
prisoners, even such a limited liberty must be guarded by procedu-
ral due process.212 
One of the most difficult problems in the procedural due pro-
cess area is defining "liberty" and "property." Traditional forms of 
real and personal property clearly are within the constitutional no-
tion of property; difficult assessments must be made, however, for 
less tangible forms such as government benefits and employment. 
The framework for analysis is that there must be more than an 
abstract desire or a unilateral expectation; property is a legitimate 
claim of entitlement not created by the Constitution but stemming 
from some independent source.218 Decisions during the survey pe-
riod provide a flavor of the concept of property for due process 
purposes. A conflict between the plaintiffs' claim to an unencum-
bered title and a town's arguable easement created in plaintiffs a 
significant property interest.214 A widow's community property in-
terest in a vehicle forfeited because it was used in her husband's 
unlawful transactions entitled her to procedural due process.21& A 
former AFDC recipient had a property interest in past-due support 
(1981). See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
209. Swilley v. Alexander, 629 F.2d 1018, 1022 (5th Cir. 1980). 
210. Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane). See also Cleveland Bd. 
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
211. Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1377 n.12 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane). See also 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
212. Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865, 867-68 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Greenholtz v. In-
mates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
213. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
214. McCulloch v. Glasgow, 620 F.2d 47, 50 (5th Cir. 1980). 
215. United States v. One 1977 Cherokee Jeep, 639 F.2d 212, 213 (5th Cir. 1981). See 
also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (upheld application of 
forfeiture statutes to innnocent owners). 
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obligations collected after termination of benefits.2IG A father in-
voluntarily committed by his daughter was deprived of property by 
her commitment action and guardianship appointment over his 
property.217 Without alleging "any 'independent source stich as 
state statutes or [other] rules,' " a high school student did not have 
a property interest in .a particular program of college preparatory 
courses she merely. desired.218 
Property claims often· arise in the context of public employ-
ment. The property interest involved is in continued employment. 
This area points out the federalism tensions involved: "While the 
State may define what is and what is not property, once having 
defined those rights the Constitution defines due process .... "218 
As in any other property interest, the legitimate claim to continued 
employment must be derived from a source independent of the 
fourteenth amendment, such as contract or federal, state or local 
law.220 Thus, the "creative mechanism" itself defines and limits the 
property interest.221 For example, the creative mechanism may de-
fine the employment as being at will or as being terminable only 
for cause; the former will not but the latter will create a property 
interest.222 Within the public employment context, the issue of 
whether a property interest exists in continued employment is en-
tirely fact-bound. 
Marrero v. City of Hialeah228 was the most significant survey 
decision defining liberty and property.224 Municipal police officers 
and a local prosecutor executed a warrant authorizing a search for 
stolen items in a jewelry store owned and operated by the plain-
tiffs. After the initial searchers could not identify any of the items 
listed on the warrant, several victims of recent local robberies were 
216. See Seagraves v. Harris, 629 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1980). 
217. Dahl v. Akin, 630 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1977 
(1981). 
218. Arundar v. Dekalb County School Dist., 620 F.!!d 493, 494 (5th Cir. 1980). See 
also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,572-73 (1975). 
219. Thompson v. Bass, 616 F.2d 1259, 1265 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 399 
, (1980) (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 185 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)). 
220. McMillian v. Hazelhurst, 620 F.2d 484, 485 (5th Cir. 1980). But see Bell v. Wolf-
ish, 441 U.S. 520, 580 (1979) (Stevens, J~, dissenting). 
221. American Fed. of Gov't Emp. v. Stetson, 640 F.2d 642, 645 (5th Cir. 1981). 
222. Thompson v. Bass, 616 F.2d 1259, 1265 (5th Cir. 1980). 
223. 625 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1980). 
224. Because the focus of this article is on procedl,ral due process in noncriminal 
cases, deprivations of life, liberty and property as criminal sanctions are not considered 
here. 
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brought to the store. Only one victim identified one bracelet as 
stolen, whereupon the plaintiffs were arrested for receipt of stolen 
property and almost the entire stock of the store was seized. All 
the local television stations covered these events, and the prosecu-
tor announced to the media that $75,000 in stolen jewelry had been 
seized along with the plaintiffs. Soon after the raid the police de-
partment announced on local radio and in local newspapers that 
much stolen property had been recovered and· that all recent rob-
bery victims should come to the police station to claim jewelry 
they could identify. A state court judge granted plaintiffs' motion 
to suppress and returned all of the seized inventory except the one 
bracelet. Plaintiffs subsequently sued the city and prosecutor· for 
willfully and knowingly violating the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments. They alleged that their business and personal reputations 
were destroyed and that they had been deprived of their right to 
earn a livelihood without due process of law. The key issue was 
whether the claim of injury to plaintiffs' personal and business rep-
utations was a deprivation of a liberty or property interest pro-
tected by the Constitution.2211 
The court's consideration of the question began with an inter-
pretation of Paul v. Davis,226 the seminal Supreme Court prece-
dent. The police had included Davis's name and photograph in a 
flyer circulated to eight hundred local merchants identifying him 
as an "active shoplifter." Davis had been charged with shoplifting 
more than a year earlier and had not been tried when the flyer 
circulated; shortly thereafter the charge was dismissed. Davis sued 
and asserted that his future employm.ent opportunities and his 
. shopping with local merchants were impaired. The Supreme Court, 
however, held that Davis's interest in his "reputation alone" was 
neither liberty nor property sufficient to invoke the procedural 
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment.227 The Marrero court 
emphasized the two-tiered analysis applied by the Supreme Court 
in Paul v. Davis. First, the Supreme Court held that reputation 
standing alone was not a liberty interest created by federallaw.226 
Rather, a federally recognized liberty interest included only a 
stigma to one's reputation incident to either some specific constitu-
225. 625 F.2d at 512-19. 
226. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
227. [d. at 712. 
228. 625 F.2d at 512 (citing 424 U.S. at 700-02). 
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tional guarantee or some "more tangible" deprivation.229 Second, 
the Supreme Court held that under the applicable state law, repu-
tation was not a liberty or a property interest. Therefore, any in-
jury inflicted by the police flyer could not constitute an unconstitu-
tional state deprivation of that interest.23o As interpreted in 
Marrero, the narrow holding of Paul v. Davis was that "no liberty 
or property interest is infringed when the only loss suffered at the 
hands of the government is damage to personal reputation if per-
sonal reputation is not recognized by the relevant state law as a 
liberty or property interest."231 Given this narrow reading, Paul v. 
Davis became a precedent for a fourfold distinction in Marrero: (1) 
the Marrero plaintiffs alleged that an unconstitutional search and 
seizure violative of the fourth amendment caused injury to their 
personal and business reputations directly implicating a constitu-
tionally created liberty;232 (2) applicable Florida law recognized 
business reputation or goodwill as a tangible legal guarantee of 
present enjoyment which was a state law-c:reated property inter-
est;233 (3) the alleged defamatory statements resulted in injury to 
both the Marrero plaintiffs' personal and business reputations, and 
to the protected property interest in goodwill;234 (4) the alleged de-
famatory statements resulted in injury to both the Marrero plain-
tiffs' personal and business reputations plus a more tangible injury 
arising out of the allegedly unconstitutional search and seizure.2311 
The court thus pointed the way around Paul v. Davis. 
Once it is determined that an \interest of constitutional magni-
tude is involved, a person may be legally deprived of that interest 
only by government action which provides due process. Determin-
ing just what process is due is an exercise in situational ethics on 
the constitutional level. The Supreme Court has determined that 
the specific dictates of due process are de~ermined in any given 
case by considering three factors: (1) "the private interest that will 
be affected by the official action"; (2) "the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
229. 625 F.2d at 513. This is the so-called "stigma plus" approach. See id. n.17. 
230. [d. at 513 (citing 424 U.S. at 711-12). The Kentucky law of tort protected Davis's 
interest in reputation. 424 U.S. at 711-12. 
231. 625 F.2d at 513 (emphasis in original). 
232. The damage to reputation was thus seen as an element of the damages from the 
invalid search. [d. at 513-14. 
233. [d. at 514-15. 
234. [d. at 515-16. 
235. [d. 
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probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards"; and (3) "the Government's interest, including the func-
tion involved and the fiscal and adminitrative burdens that the ad-
ditional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."236 
For a short while the most noteworthy procedural due process 
development during the survey period came in Davis v. Page/a3? On 
rehearing en bane, the majority238 held that in a state adjudication 
of child dependency involving the possibility of prolonged and in-
definite deprivation of parental custody due process required that 
"an indigent parent be offered counsel and that counsel be pro-
vided unless a knowing and intelligent waiver is made."239 A post-
survey Supreme Court decision has replaced this absolute rule with 
the more traditional case-by-case due process approach.240 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
Overbreadth, Vagueness, and Least Restrictive Means 
Three general principles of first amendment jurisprudence, the 
doctrines of overbreadth, vagueness and least restrictive means, 
236. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976): See also Mackey v. Montrym, 443 
U.S. 1 (1979); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977). . 
237. ·640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 
238. A thirteen-judge majority was opposed by an eleven-judge minority which joined 
in Judge Brown's dissenting opinion. [d. at 605 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
239. [d. at 604. Compare Rowell v. Ortelere, 626 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1980) (routine 
private litigation between parents over child custody did not require appointment of counsel 
for indigent parent). 
240. The en banc court's course marked an abrupt departure from Supreme Court 
decisional law. The Supreme Court has often observed that the "right to be heard would be, 
in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-70 (1970) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-
69 (1932». Yet the high Court had never applied a per se rule of procedural due process to 
require appointment of counsel for indigents in noncriminal proceedings. Instead, in non-
criminal procedural due process the determination whether to appoint counsel for an indi-
gent was left to a case-by-case analysis. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539. (1974); Boldberg 
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
The en bane court's novel approach, however, was short-lived. One month after the 
survey period ended, Davis was effectively overruled when the Supreme Court decided 
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981). Applying the three factors 
described above for evaluating what process is due and the same analysis the en bane court 
had used in Davis the Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion and rejected an abso-
lute right to appointed counsel in parental status termination proceedings in favor of a case-
by-case decision by the trial court subject to appellate review. The Supreme Court reasoned 
that a presumption arose that an indigent litigant was entitled to appointed counsel only 
when, if defeated, the litigant would be deprived of physical liberty. 
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drew the court's attention during the survey period. Closely re-
lated, the three doctrines are often considered together in deciding 
a first amendment case and distinctions among the three are some-· 
times blurred. 
In Shamloo v. Mississippi State Board of Trustees,z.u Iranian 
students who had been subjected to disciplinary action by a state 
university for participating in demonstrations supporting the new 
government in their country challenged the university's regulations 
governing demonstrations. The relevant university regulation pro-
vided for approval of "activities of a wholesome nature."Z42 The 
court held the requirement that an activity be "wholesome" before 
it was subject to approval was unconstitutionally vague. First, dif-
ferent university officials could and did attach different meanings 
to the words which allowed for arbitrary and discriminatory appli-
cation.243 Second, the regulation was not specific enough to give 
fair warning; a college student would have much difficulty in deter-
mining whether a proposed activity was prohibited, unwholesome 
·conduct.u4 . 
The sec~nd noteworthy overbreadth and vagueness decision 
was Reeves v. McConn.z411 A municipal ordinance regulating opera-
tion of sound amplification equipment was challenged as being 
overbroad and vague.246 · At the outset the court noted important 
241. 620 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1980). 
242. [d. at' 519. . . 
243 .. [d. at 523-24. 
244. [d. The approach the court adopted' in evaluating university regulations was to 
consider "whether the college students would have any 'difficulty in understanding what 
conduct the regulations allow and what conduct they prohibit.' " [d. at 524 (emphasis ad-
ded) (quoting Jenkins v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992, 1004 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
245. 631 F;2d 377 (5th Cir. 1980). . . 
246. The operative part of the ordimince provided: 
(b) The use of Bound amplification equipment outside of buildings, or other en-
closed structures within the city, except on residential property, is subject to the fol-
lowing regulations: 
(1) The operation of sound amplifying equipment is prohibited Monday through 
Saturday within the downtown business district. A permit must be obtained for the 
operation of such equipment in these areas on Sunduys. Any such Sunday permit 
shall state the business district to which same applies und shall be valid for only one 
day. Each separate Sunday must have a separate permit. Provided, however, that the 
provisions of this section shall not apply to parade permits which have been obtained 
from city council. . 
(2) The operation of sound amplifying equipment is prohibited between the hours 
of 7:00 p.m. and 10:00 a.m. daily, and further prohibited on Sunday between 10:00 
a.m. and 1:00 p.m. 
(3) . The sounds amplified shall not be obscene or slanderous. 
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limits on the two doctrines. Only if the challenged portion of the 
ordinance would not allow a limiting, constitutional construction 
and the alleged overbreadth was both real and substantial would 
the particular provision be held invalid. The general due process-
vagueness standard was heightened, and the statute more strictly 
construed, since the alleged inhibition was in the domain of free 
speech.2.7 With these two notions in mind, the court considered 
each specific provision of the challenged ordinance. 
The city argued two justifications for the subparagraph 1 pro-
hibition of all sound amplification in the downtown business ·dis-
trict except for certain hours on Sunday: first, the law would pre-
vent disruption of normal business activity and, second, it would 
prevent unsafe distractions for pedestrians and drivers. The court 
held the subparagraph overly broad because there was "probably 
no more appropriate place for reasonably amplified free speech," 
and the two proper ends could be served by a more tailored ordi-
nance.us Thus, subparagraph 1 unnecessarily reached protected 
speech. Subparagraph 2 prohibited all sound amplification between 
7:00 p.m. and 10:00 a.m. and between 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. on 
Sundays. The city urged this was a reasonable <regulation for "pre-
serving the tranquility of Sunday morning for religious services 
and of the evening, night, and early morning hours for rest, q~iet 
(4) The sound amplifying equipment on a sound truck shall not be operated unless 
the truck is moving at a speed of at least ten (10) miles per hour, except when the 
sound truck is stopped or impeded by traffic. When the sound truck is stopped by 
traffic, the sound amplifying equipment shaH not be operated for longer than one 
minute at each such stop. 
(5) The operation of sound amplifying equipment is prohibited within one hundred 
(100) yards of any hospital, school, Church or courthouse. 
(6) The volume of sound amplified shaH be controHed so that it is not u~reasonably 
loud, raucous, jarring, disturbing or a nuisance to persons within the area of 
audibility. 
(7) No sound amplifying equipment shaH be oPElratedwith an excess of twenty (20) 
watts of power in the last stage of amplification. . 
In May 1978, the City Council made the foHowing addition to subparagraph 5: 
(5) The operation of sound amplifying equipment is prohibited ... within fifty (50) 
yards of any public' or private residential structure. For the purposes of this ordi-
nance, "public or private residential structure" shaH mean any structure wherein a 
person or persons reside, either temporarily or permanently, including but not limited 
to single family and multi-family residences, apartments, duplexes, condominiums, 
motels, hotels, boarding houses, and rooming houses. 
[d. at 380 n.l (quoting HOUSTON, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 29-6 (1976)). 
247. 631 F.2d at 383 (citing Hynes v. Mayor and City Council of OradeH, 425 U.S. 610 
(1976)). 
248. 631 F.2d at 384. 
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reflection, and family togetherness."24& The government's interest 
in protecting individuals' rights to home privacy, however, is 
greatly diminished when the individual goes to public places.2l1o 
Because the city failed to narrow the regulation as to situs or time, 
the prohibition was overbroad in its reach.2111 Subparagraph 5 of 
the ordinance prohibited sound amplification within a certain dis-
tance of residences, schools, courthouses, hospitals and churches. 
Unlike subparagraph 2, location was the sole criterion and time 
was not considered. While the court recognized a state interest in 
preserving privacy and efficiency of operation, the provision swept 
too broadly by including protected activity which took place at a 
time or in a manner which did not interfere with the character of 
the particular interest sought to be statut6rily safeguarded.2112 
Subparagraphs 4, 6, and 7, which required sound trucks to 
move at a speed of at least ten miles per hour unless stopped in 
traffic and to cease broadcasting one minute after stopping, also 
were held overbroad because they reached beyond that which actu-
ally created or imminently threatened· disruption or traffic hazards. 
Subparagraph 6 required the volume of sound amplification to be 
controlled so as not to be "unreasonably loud, raucous, jarring, dis-
turbing, or a nuisance to persons within the area of audibility." 
The court easily approved against a claim of vagueness the terms 
"unreasonably," "nuisance," "loud," "raucous" and "Jarring" be-
cause, although abstract, the terms "have through daily use ac-
quired a content that conveys to any interested person a suffi-
ciently accurate concept of what is forbidden."2113 The remaining 
language in the subsection, "disturbing . . . to persons within the 
area of audibility," was upheld only with the expectation that a 
state court would interpret the term objectively to mean "actual or 
imminent interference with ... 'peace or good order.' "2114 Subpar-
agraph 7 established a maximum wattage. The district court invali-
dated this provision because a regulation keyed to decibels at the 
point of hearing would have been a more precise measure of dis-
ruptiveness. While agreeing that the decibel measure was a less re-
strictive means of regulation, the Fifth Circuit noted that the rec-
249. [d. 
250. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
251. 631 F.2d at 384-85. 
252. [d. at 385. 
253. Id. at 386 (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 79 (1949)). 
254. 631 F.2d at 386 (citing Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109-12 (1972)). 
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ord disclosed that the small gain in precision was more than offset 
by administrative inconvenience in enforcement. Administrative 
convenience was recognized as a relevant consideration in judging 
the reasonableness of the regulation. The court did strike the pro-
vision, however, as being overbroad in that the record indicated 
sound amplified in excess of the watt limit was not necessarily 
disruptive. 
Subparagraph 3 prohibited the amplification of the "obscene 
or slanderous." The court held the obscenity provision not uncon-
stitutionally overbroad, drawing an analogy to the broadcast media 
for which the Supreme Court has tolerated closer regulation.zlIlI 
Nor was the provisi~n vague.ZlI8 The term "slanderous" in subpara-
graph 3 was deemed both vague and overbroad because a speaker 
would be in doubt whether speech about public figures and officials 
would be protected.2117 
The third related decision was Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of 
Mesquite. 2118 The ordinance, which restricted operation of coin-slot 
amusement devices, was deemed vague, overbroad and not the 
least restrictive means. The ordinance, inter alia, permitted the 
police chief to make a licensing denial recommendation based on 
an applicant's "connections with criminal elements."2I1B Because 
the nature of the improper association was unspecified and the of-
ficials were given no guidance in deciding the quality or quantity of 
negative relationships, the ordinance failed the vagueness test.280 
Because such an ordinance attached serious consequences which 
would deter protected associations, the ordinance was overbroad as 
well.281 Finally, the ordinance failed the less-drastic-means test be-
cause nonassociational conduct regulations could serve the purpose 
of assuring that proper and suitable persons operated such 
establishments.28z 
255. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
256. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 110-14 (1974). 
257. See Gerty v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
258. 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980). See text accompanying notes 185-205 supra. 
259. [d. at 1034 n.6 (quoting Mesquite, Tex., Ordinance 1103). 
260. 630 F.2d at 1037-38. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), in which a 
vague reference to "member of any gang" was held unconstitutional. 
261. See Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1980) ("right to freely asso-
ciate is not limited to those associations which are 'political in the customary sense' but 
includes those which 'pertain to the social, legal and economic benefit' "). 
262. 630 F.2d at 1042. 
HeinOnline -- 27 Loy. L. Rev. 842 1981
842 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 27:805 
Government Employment 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the government's in-
terest in regulating the first amendment activity of its employees is 
different from the regulation of citizens generally. Ordinarily, the 
government as an employer may not coerce its employees to com-
promise their beliefs or place otherwise unconstitutional conditions 
upon government employment. The government employee, how-
ever, does not enjoy an absolute protection which outweighs any 
government interest.16s 
In Williams u. Board of Regents,l" a university police officer 
alleged that he had been dismissed impermissibly following his dis-
closure of an alteration of a university accident report made to 
protect a local official. The defendants sought to establish a Pick-
ering defensel6G of the necessity for maintaining discipline and har-
mony in such a quasi-military organization.166 The court recog-
nized a need for police discipline approaching its importance in the 
militaryl67 and appreciated the resultant disruption and dishar-
mony such a disclosure would bring. While the aegis of the first 
amendment is not dependent upon the "social worth" of the ex-
pression,166 the nature of the speech is considered relevant to the 
263. See generally Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
264. 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980). 
265. In Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the Supreme Court struck a 
balance between the interest of the citizen-employee in the exercise of a constitutional right 
and the interest of the goverment-employer in efficiently accomplishing public service 
through its employees. When the citizen-employee's interest is fundamental, government 
interests to be balanced include: (1) the need for maintaining discipline by immediate 
superiors or harmony among coworkers; (2) the employee's position necessitates "personal 
loyalty and confidence"; (3) the need for confidentiality is great; (4) the activity impedes the 
employee's proper performance; (5) the government's difficulty of effectively countering 
false accusations; (6) the statements are so without foundation as to call into question the 
employee's competence; (7) the appropriateness of the time, manner and place of the activ-
ity; and (8) the public's interest in having the challenged activity performed. An employee 
of the government establishes a constitutional violation by meeting three requirements. 
First, the activity involved was constitutionally protected. Second, the activity involved was 
a substantial factor in the government's decision to impose a sanction. Third, the same 
sanction would not have been imposed, in any event, had the activity involved not occurred. 
266. The district court had ruled, as a matter of law, that the defense was unavailable 
and the evidence, therefore, inadmissible. FED. R. EVID. 401. 629 F.2d at 1002. The Fifth 
Circuit consistently has recognized such a defense when supported in the record. See, e.g., 
Lindsey v. Board of Regents, 607 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979); Garza v. Rodriguez, 559 F.2d 259 
(5th Cir. 1977); Abbot v. Thetford, 534 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc). 
267. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). 
268. See Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 
564 (1969). 
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Pickering balance.289 Because the falsification of the document in-
volved a betrayal of public trust and because the plaintiff, as the 
officer on duty was himself implicated, the Pickering defense was 
not available to frustrate the claim of an innocent and perhaps 
praiseworthy· employee. The balance was struck in favor of the. 
plaintiff employee. 
In Van Ooteghem u. Gray,270 the plaintiff was an assistant 
county treasurer who was dismissed because of a dispute over his 
decision to address the county commissioner's court on the subject 
of civil rights of homosexuals. On appeal the majority considered 
, the Pickering baiance to have been refined to require a compelling 
state interest for the government-employer's regulation of an em-
ployee's protected speech.271 Under this approach, the government-
employer would have to establish that the regulation of speech was 
necessary to avoid a material and substantial interference with the 
government operation. The imposition of a restricted work sched-
ule which led to the employee's dismissal was not so justified. The 
only disturbance resuliing from plaintiff's outspokenness was some 
distress among his co-workers which was deemed insignificant. Be-
cause the plaintiff's protected speech· was a substantial factor in 
his dismissal, the balance in favor of the employee meant his claim 
was valid.272 
The special concurring opinion questioned the majority's con-
clusion that Pickering had been refined into a compelling state in-
terest standard.273 Instead, the distinction was made between, on 
the one hand, restraints on public employees' rights of belief and 
association which required a compelling state interest and, on the 
other hand, restraints on public employees' rights to free speech 
which required a Pickering balancing.274 Such an approach was 
deemed more consistent with Supreme Court precedent,2711 prop-
269. 629 F.2d at 1003. 
270. 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 203 (1981). 
271. Id. at 492-93. 
272. A dismissal substantially based on protected activity will go unremedied unless 
. there is proof that "but for" the protected activity the dismissal would not have occurred. 
Id. at 493 (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977». 
273. 628 F.2d at 497-500 (Reavely, J., specially concurring). See also Bickel v. Burk-
hart, 632 F.2d 1251, 1255 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980).1 
274. 628 F.2d at 498-99. 
275. Id. at 498 (distinguishing Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 347 (1976) and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) from Givhan v. Western Line 
Conso!. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979), Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 
(1977), and Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968». 
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erly cognizant of a constitutional hierarchy of first amendment· 
rights,276 and as not imposing a nearly insul'mountable burden on 
the government as employer. It remains to be seen whether future 
Pickering-type speech issues will be decided under the compelling 
state interest requirement or the balancing approach.277 
In Davis v. Williams278 and Bickel v. Burkhart,279 the court, 
sitting en banc and in panel, upheld the facial validity and applica-
tion·of fire department rules which regulated the free speech of fire 
fighters.28o At issue was a so-called "catch-all" provision which pro-
hibited public employees from engaging in conduct prejudicial to 
good order. In Davis the en banc court appli~~d a Pickering balance 
to conclude that the regulation did not unconstitutionally intrude 
on protected first amendment activity on its way to upholding its 
facial validity.281 In Bickel the panel concluded that a claim could 
be predicated on employer action short of termination such as a 
denial of promotion.282 Easily satisfied were the requirements that 
the alleged protected activity was a substantial and motivating fac-
tor in the challenged denial and the employee would have been 
promoted "but for" his speech. In Bickel the employee had been 
critical of the department at a meeting with the fire chief and the 
fire chiefs superior, raising the government's need for harmony 
and discipline. Because the speech, set in time, place and manner 
context, was consistent with the purpose of the meeting, to air 
grievances, it was deemed constitutionally protected. The court 
thus recognized that private as well as public speech of govern-
ment employees was protected.28s 
276. According to the concurring judge, the rights of belief and association are "the 
most preferred of .the preferred rights" and do not have the potential for interference that 
speech has in the employment context. 628 F.2d at 499. 
277. Acknowledging the "existence of some dispute," a subsequent panel did not need 
to decide which was the correct standard. Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251, 1256 n.8 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (speech satisfied both standards). Seemingly the rule of interpanel accord would 
require later decisions to follow the Van Ooteghem majority. See Baker, Precedent Times 
Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Filth Circuit, 35 S. W.L.J. 687, 720-24 (1981). Initial 
indications suggest, however, that the distinction has gone unnoticed and the balancing ap-
proach has been applied in speech cases. See, e.g., Smalley v. Eatonville, 640 Jt'.2d 765 (5th 
Cir. 1981); Williams V. Board of Regents, 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980). 
278. 617 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937 (1981). 
279. 632 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1980). 
280. While the regulations were from different departments, they were identical. Id. at 
1254-55. 
281. 617 F.2d at 1102 n.2 & 1104-05. 
282. 632 F.2d at 1255 n.6. See also Stone V. Board of Regents, 620 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
283. 632 F.2d at 1256 (citing Givhan V. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 
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During the survey period the court decided another Pickering-
type case in the important subcategory of patronage, which was 
recently described by the Supreme Court.284 Five former deputies 
sued the county sheriff and alleged that patronage unconstitution-
ally motivated their discharge in Tanner v. McCall. l86 The case did 
not involve either the wholesale discharge of out-party employees· 
or the dismissal of such employees who were without in-party 
sponsorship.188 Instead, party affiliation was only tangentially rele-
vant. Plaintiffs alleged that they were not reappointed either be-
cause of their support for the defeated incumbent or because the 
newly-elected sheriff wished to hire his own political supporters. 
The plaintiffs' proof was found wanting because the facts did not 
support their claim that retention or appointment coincided with 
support and loyalty for an individual politician rather than a polit-
ical party.187 Because· the evidence did not support plaintiffs' 
claim, the court did not have to decide the extent to which the 
Constitution protected against such requirements of loyalty to an 
individual.288 
410 (1979». See also Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dept., 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
284. See generally The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REV. 56, 186-96 
(1976). The patronage decisions have been somewhat controversial. See generally Loughney 
v. Hickey, 635 F.2d 1063, 1064 (3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert, J., concurring). 
285. 625 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1975 (1981). 
286. The court thereby distinguished Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) and Branti 
v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). In Elrod the Supreme Court had applied the Pickering analy-
sis to partisan dismissals of sheriffs' office employees and required a compelling state inter-
est to outweigh the employees' associational rights: 
[I]f conditioning the retention of public employment on the employee's support of 
the in-party is to survive consitutional challenge, it must further some vital govern-
ment end by a means that is least restrictive of freedom of belief and association in 
achieving that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the loas of constitutionally 
protected rights. 
427 U.S. at 363 (footnote omitted). In Branti the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a 
planned termination of assistant public defenders solely because they had not been spon-
sored by the in-party. However, an exception was noted: U[I]f an employee's private political 
beliefs would interfere with the discharge of his public duties, his First Amendment rightS 
may be required to yield to the State's vital interest in maintaining governmental effective-
ness and efficiency." 445 U.S. at 517. 
287. U[T]he objective manifestations [did] not supply inferences that rise to the level 
of proof of a subjective intent of political animus." 625 F.2d at 1193. It was clear to the 
court that the same decision would have been made regardless of the plaintiff's constitution-
ally protected conduct. [d. at 1190-96. 
288. [d. at 1190. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
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Defamation 
Since the Supreme Court has brought the law of defamation 
within the scope of the Constitution when the defamed person is a 
public official289 or an all-purpose public figure290 or a limited-pur-
pose public figure,291 libel and slander actions have an important 
first amendment dimension. During the survey period the court 
considered the various defendant categories and the concomitant 
degree of first amendment protection of the defamer. 
No survey decision involved a plaintiff who was a public offi-
cial, although public figures were involved in several cases. Because 
"the question of public figure status is pervasive," the court ex-
horted an early determination in such cases.292 Persons who as-
sume "roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society" are 
public figures.298 While "[s]ome occupy positions of such persua-
sive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all 
purposes," it is "[m]ore commonly ... public figures [who] have 
thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controver-
sies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved."294 
The four survey defamation appeals suggest the breadth of the 
public figure category which included: the Church of Scientology of 
California,2911 the Secretary-Treasurer of the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters,298 a husband who was a former collegiate and 
professional athlete and a wife who had gained considerable media 
exposure during an earlier entertainment career and a romance 
with Elvis Presley even though she no longer was involved in either 
the career or the romance,297 and the owners of a city ambulance 
service.li98 . 
There must be a defamation, and the constitutional require-
289. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964). 
290. Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
291. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323 (1974). 
292. Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 724 (5th Gir.), modified on 
rehearing, 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981). 
293. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). 
294. [d. See also Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., 
concurring). 
295. Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272, 1286 (5th Cir. 1981). 
296. Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 722 (5th Cir. 1980). 
297. Brewer v. Memphis Publ. Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1240 (5th Cir. 1980). 
298. Long v. Arcell, 618 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1980) (stipulation), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 
869 (1981). 
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ment is that the falsehood is factual as opposed to mere opinion.299 
In Church of Scientology v. Cazares,soo the mayor's references to 
the Church as a gung-ho group, associated with a mass-murderer, 
having. armed guards, and a "rip-off' commercial operation were 
not defamatory when measured in context. SOl In Brewer v. Mem-
phis Publishing CO.,802 a newspaper item allegedly stating that the 
plaintiff husband had been divorced and cuckolded was defama-
tory under applicable state law. sos Under the constitutional test, 
however, where the husband and wife plaintiffs are both public 
figures, the statement must be shown to have been made with "ac-
tual malice," defined as knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of 
truth or falsity. S04 The focus of actual. malice is not on whether the 
publisher acted unreasonably or with ill will, but rather on defen-
. dant's subjective state of mind. There must be clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the defendant knew the statement was false or in 
fact entertained real doubt as to its authenticity.soa In the instant 
case the evidence was found insufficient to warrant this conclu-
sion~ S06 Because of the highly particularized nature of this issue 
and the scope of appellate review, however, the answer to this in-
quiry is completely fact-bound.80? 
Discovery in these cases also raises constitutional issues. In 
Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc.,sos a libel plaintiff who was a 
public figure sought disclosure of a confidential source for the al-
leged defamatory article. The court considered the issue triangu-
lated by three rulings of the Supreme Court: (1) a public figure can 
recover in a defamation case only upon a showing of actual mal-
ice;s09 (2) reporters in grand jury proceedings must disclose the 
299. Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272, 1286-89 (5th Cir. 1981); Brewer 
v. Memphis Publ. Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1244 (5th Cir. 1980). 
300. 638 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1981). 
301. [d. at 1286-89. 
302. 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980). 
303. [d. at 1244. But see id. at 1260-61 (Godbold, J., specially concurring). 
304. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323, 342 (1974); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
305. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 
(1968). 
306. 626 F.2d at 1247-60. 
307. Compare Brewer v. Memphis Publ. Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980), with 
Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), and Long v. Arcell, 618 
F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1980). 
308. 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980). 
309. Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
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identities of confidential sources unless the process is abused;slO 
and (3) there was "no First Amendment privilege against discovery 
of mental processes ... for ... determining whether malice ex-
isted."311 The court concluded that a plaintiff in a libel suit could 
compel disclosure of the confidential source upon a showing of sub-
stantial evidence that (1) the statement was defamatory; (2) rea-
sonable efforts to uncover alternative sources were unsuccessful 
and no other reasonable source existed; and (3) knowledge of the 
identity of the informant was essential to prepare and present the 
law suit.slI Having satisfied these essentials, the plaintiff was enti-
tled to learn the identity of the confidential source. 
Free Association 
The first amendment right to free association was the touch-
stone for two significant decisions during the survey period.su 
Let's Help Florida v. McCrarySH. involved a state statute which 
restricted the size of contributions to a single political committee 
in a referendum election. SlO Although protected under the first 
amendment as an incident of free association, political contribu-
tions are not as protected as campaign expenditures since contri-
bution limits merely require that funds be generated from a large 
number of people and do not directly limit political communica-
tion.sul Nevertheless, a state must establish "a sufficiently impor-
tant interest and emplo[y] means closely drawn to avoid unneces-
sary abridgment of associational freedoms."317 The court drew a 
distinction between contributions to candidates and contributions 
supporting either side of a referendum issue. A state's substantial 
interest in preventing the actual, or even apparent, corruption of 
candidates through dependence on large contributions is simply 
not present in a referendum election. S18 The state argued that re-
310. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Since Branzburg involved the criminal 
process, arguably a lesser state interest is balanced against a claim of privilege in a defama-
tion civil suit. 
311. 621 F.2d at 725 (citing Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979)). 
312. 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), modifying on rehearing, 621 F.2d 721 
(5th Cir.). 
313. Free association also played a significant role in Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of 
Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980). See text accompanying notes 258-262 supra. 
314. 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980). 
315. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.08(I)(d) (West Supp. 1980) ($3,000 maximum). 
316. 621 F.2d at 199 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 21-22 (1976)). 
317. 621 F.2d at 199 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S; I, 25 (1976)). 
318. 621 F.2d at 200. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-91 (1978); 
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strictions on the size of contributions promoted a policy of disclos-
ure by preventing large donors from funneling large sums through 
a committee. While this was an important state interest, it was 
poorly served by the contribution restriction which unnecessarily 
infringed on association, because such limits merely provided an 
incentive to organize multiple committees in the same referendum. 
Because of the abridgement of free association, the statute was 
held violative of the first and fourteenth amendments.819 
The second free association decision came in Familias Unidas 
v. Briscoe. 8l10 At issue was a state statute which empowered a 
county judge to exact public disclosure of membership and other 
information concerning organizations considered to be engaged in 
activities designed to interfere with the peaceful operation of the 
public schools.8l11 The fundamental right to associate for the pur-
pose of "advancing ideas and airing grievances" contains an ele-
ment of privacy.8l1l1 Compulsory disclosure of organizational mem-
bership often frustrates free association by leading to such 
disincentives as threats and actual reprisals.8l18 Recognizing this re-
ality, the Supreme Court generally requires a showing that such 
compulsory disclosures be substantially related to a compelling 
state interest824 and satisfy the least restrictive means test.8l111 The . 
Supreme Court had held that the preservation of peaceful and un-
disrupted schools was indeed a compelling state purpose,8l16 and, 
further, as limited to organizations "engaged in activities designed 
to hinder, harass, or interfere with"827 the schools, the disclosure 
was substantially related to the state's purpose. Nonetheless, in 
Familias Unidas the statute was held to unnecessarily invade free 
association rights. To reach this result, the Fifth Circuit panel had 
to distinguish a line of Supreme Court cases which upheld analo-
C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 583 F.2d 421, 424-25 (9th Cir. 1978). 
319. 621 F.2d at 201. 
320. 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980). 
321. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 4.28 (Vernon 1972). 
322. NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-62 (1958); Ealy v. Little-
john, 569 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1978). 
323. See Gibson v. Florida Leg. Invest. Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963); Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
324. Gibson v. Florida Leg. Invest. Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). 
325. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); NAACP v. Alabama ex. rei. Flowers, 377 U.S. 
288 (1964). 
326. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
327. 619 F.2d at 399. 
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gous disclosure requirements and recognized disclosure and resul-
tant public scrutiny as legitimate means to deter groups from ille-
gal activities.328 One distinction was that under the challenged 
statute disclosure and public recrimination would be felt by the 
unknowing and passive member to whom the school disruption in-
terest is irrelevant. The line of cases distinguished, however, some-
times considered this development an unfortunate but unavoidable 
cost of serving the important state interest.329 The court perceived 
two critical distinctions which helped it to avoid these precedents. 
First, the organizations, in the distinguished cases, the Communist 
Party and the Ku Klux Klan, had a history and tradition of unlaw-
ful tactics. Under the challenged statute, organizations which 
might be required to disclose membership may be unknown quan-
tities so that a passive, unknowing member of an otherwise benign 
organization could be the object of recriminations once some other 
members independently interfered with the schools.880 Second, the 
disclosure requirement itself was different. The distinguished cases 
had involved statutes designed to deter future conduct by disclos-
ure at a time when limiting disclosure to only the dangerous mem-
bers was impossible. The challenged statute in Familias Unidas, 
on the other hand, deterred the unwanted activity not so much by 
exposure, but by the threat of exposure should the organization 
interfere with the schools. After the organization was so tainted, 
some members would have differentiated themselves as knowing 
and active supporters. Therefore, to hold disclosure and reprisal 
over the head of all members, active and passive, knowing and un-
knowing, unnecessarily infringed on free association.831 
Religion Clauses 
Finally, the first amendment's religion clauses attracted brief 
attention from the court. In EEOC v. Mississippi College,m. a 
328. See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 
367 U.S. 1 (1961); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); New York ex rei. Byrant v. Zim-
merman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928). 
329. See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 
367 U.S. 1 (1961); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); NllW York ex rei. Bryant v. Zim-
merman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928). 
330. 619 F.2d at 401 (citing Gibson v. Florida Leg. Invest. Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 547 
n.2 (1963». 
331. The statute was held facially invalid. 619 F.2d at 402. See also text accompanying 
notes 54-57 supra. 
332. 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980). 
HeinOnline -- 27 Loy. L. Rev. 851 1981
1981] Constitutional Law 851 
white female filed a charge with the EEOC against a college owned, . 
controlled and operated by a religious institution, alleging discrim-
ination towards blacks. The first amendment issues presented were 
whether application of Title VII to the college violated the two re-
ligion clauses. 
The prohibition on the congressional establishment of religion 
involves three elements: (1) whether there is a secular purpose be-
hind the statute; (2) whether the primary effect of the statute 
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) whether the statute 
results in "an excessive government entanglement with religion."aaa 
The third element was the only one arguably applicable. "Exces-
sive entanglement" is, in turn, divided into three elements: (1) the 
character and purpose of the institution benefited; (2) the nature 
of the government aid; and (3) the resultant relationship between 
the government and the religious institution. a84 While traditional 
establishment clause cases consider legislation that benefits reli-
gion, the same establishment clause policy against excessive entan-
glements applies to burdensome measures such as were urged con-
cerning the application of Title VII.8811 The court found that in 
Mississippi College the character and purpose of the educational 
religious institution were purely sectarian. Additionally, the bur-
den to be imposed on the college of riondiscrimination by sex or 
race would not necessarily interfere with efforts at recruiting 
faculty with appropriate religious values. And finally, the resulting 
relationship between the EEOC and the college would be narrowed 
by the charge of the agency. Since no religious tenets required sex 
or race discrimination, the second and third elements outweighed 
the first. Hence, the application of Title VII did not run afoul of 
the establishment restriction. a88 
The court next turned to the free exercise clause. The Su-
preme Court has identified three factors in determining whether a . 
government action restrains a sincerely held religious belief: (1) the 
severity of the impact upon the exercise of the belief; (2) whether 
there is a compelling government interest justifying the encroach-
ment; and (3) the extent to which requiring a religious exemption 
333. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
334. [d. at 615. 
335. Compare Committee for Public Educ. and ReI. Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 
(1980) with NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
336. 626 F.2d at 486-88. 
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would frustrate the state from achieving its purpose.887 The first 
factor had already been discounted in analyzing the establishment 
clause claim. While enforcement proceedings with all their re-
straints could have a severe impact on the institution, the impact 
on the religious beliefs involved was minimal. Second, the court 
recognized a compelling government interest in eliminating dis-
crimination.888 Third, the court reasoned that religious employers, 
while comparatively small in number, played so significant a role 
in the economy that a religious exemption was unworkable. There-
fore, the free exercise clause was not violated by application of Ti-
tle VIl889 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
The fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause "embod-
ies the fundamental principle of American constitutionalism that 
the state must govern impartially."uo During the survey period the 
court evaluated claims along the entire equal protection spectrum. 
The treatment here seeks merely to sample the Fifth Circuit's 
work product. 
Reasonableness Standard. 
No legislation applies to all people and treats them identically; 
all statutes classify or discriminate by imposing and excusing bur-
dens or providing benefits for some and not others. The issue then 
becomes: When do such classifications or discriminations violate 
the equal protection clause? All persons need not be treated iden-
tically; equal does not mean the same, and not all discriminations 
are invidious. Just as in issues of substantive due process, reasona-
bleness is usually enough.an If a distinction is made between simi-
larly situated individuals, the classification or discrimination must 
be fair and must be reasonably related to a legitimate purpose be-
hind the statute. "A state violates the Equal Protection Clause 
when it irrationally treats differently those similarly situated or 
337. [d. at 488 (citing Wi8consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972». 
338. 626 F.2d at 488 (citing Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 323 
(5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Goldberg, J., specially concurring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 
(1978». 
339. 626 F.2d at 488-89. 
340. Anderson v. Winter, 631 F.2d 1238, 1240 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 
941 (1981). 
341. See text accompanying notes 165-205 supra. 
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when it irrationally treats similarly those people situated differ-
ently."S4! A state regulation in social and economic matters does 
not violate equal protection "merely because the classifications 
made ... are imperfect."s4S As an example, under this traditional 
standard the court upheld a state's dual retirement system which 
provided more liberal retirement and disability benefits to highway 
safety patrol officers than to agents of the bureau of narcotics even 
assuming that the latter faced equal or greater on-the-job danger, 
which was the professed state rationale. S44 Such an underinclusive 
measure was not unconstitutional just because it did not extend 
benefits as far as the rationale would allow. A state was not re-
quired to "choose between attacking every aspect of it problem or 
not attacking the problem at all."8411 
. A state law may be fair on its face, however, and be so un-
equally applied that equal protection is violated.846 Such was the 
case in Ziegler v. Jackson. 847 A character standard required that an 
applicant for the state police academy "never [have] been con-
victed of a felony or a misdemeanor involving either force, violence 
or moral turpitude. "S48 Already employed and scheduled to enter 
the academy, plaintiff was convicted of two misdemeanors, 
presenting a firearm and criminal provocati~n. When he was not 
permitted to attend the academy, plaintiff made an equal protec-
tion attack, not on the face of the character standard, but on its 
application. He established that the character standard had not 
prohibited admission to the academy of three other individuals 
who had been convicted of assault and forgery. While these crimes 
necessarily involved force and moral turpitude, the two crimes he 
was convicted of did not.848 In the absence of any rational justifica-
tion for the differential treatment,8110 the court held that plaintiff 
342. Silva v. Vowell, 621 F.2d 640, 647 (5th Cir. 1980). 
343. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). 
344. Anderson v. Winter, 631 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980). 
345. Id. at 1241 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970». 
346. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
347. 638 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1981). 
348. Id. at 777. 
349. Presenting a firearm was defined in ALA. CODE § 13-6-126 (1975) as mere: "pre-
sent[ing) at another person any gun, pistol or other firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or 
any Roman candle." Crimial provocation was defined in ALA. CODE § 13-1-50 (1975) as: "by 
words, signs or gestures, provok[ing) or attempt[ing) to provoke another to commit an as-
sault or an assault and battery upon him, such other person having then and there the 
ability to commit such assault or assault and battery." See 638 F.2d at 777 nn.1 & 2. 
350. The court did not rely on an invidious discrimination rationale. Nevertheless, ra-
cial overtones were suggested. The court did mention that plaintiff was black and the dep-
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had been denied equal protection.3111 
Strict Scrutiny 
The second tier of the traditional equal protection analysis re-
quires the court to apply a strict scrutiny to classifications which 
either infringe on a fundamental right or discriminate between 
persons, with regard to any right, upon a suspect basis. For exam-
ple, the court applied a strict scrutiny in Helms v. Jones,3112 a case 
testing a state statute which made the crime of child abandonment 
a misdemeanor if the offense occurred within the state and a fel-
ony if the abandoning parent left the state or abandoned the child 
after leaving the state.8118 Since the additional risk imposed on 
abandoning parents leaving the state infringed on the fundamental 
right to travel, the strict scrutiny test required a compelling state 
justification.m The state argued that the greater difficulty in gain-
ing extradition of felons and the cost of state support for aban-
doned children compelled the classification. Deemed only broadly 
conclusory by the court, these arguments were found insufficient to 
justify the encroachment on a fundamental right in part because 
the state had enacted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act which served these same ends.31111 Since the Act pro-
tected these interests, there was no compelling need for the chal-
lenged statute, and the classification denied equal protection.8l1e 
uty with whom he had the criminal provocation was white as were two of the three individu-
als who were allowed to be police officers despite their convictions. 638 F.2d at 778-79 nn.7 
& 8. Such a discrimination, if actual, would have made the decision more consistent with the 
mainstream of cases. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
351. 638 F.2d at 779. 
352. 621 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1980). 
353. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-9902 (Supp. 1981). 
354. Interstate travel is a recognized fundamental right. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa 
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). 
355. GA. CODE ANN. § 99-9A (Supp. 1981). 
356. 621 F.2d at 212-13. Also of some significance was the admitted failure of the state 
to effect enforcement of the challenged statute. [d. at 213 n.7. Alternatively, the court also 
recognized that the challenged statute violated the less drastic means rule. [d. at 213. The 
Supreme Court reversed shortly after the survey period, reasoning t~at since the misde-
meanor of abandonment had occurred before the defendant left the state, his right to travel 
was diminished and fleeing the state aggravated the offense. The state was permitted to 
treat the entire sequence as a more serious offense. Once the interference with the right to 
travel was deemed not to have encroached on a fundamental right and the state applied the 
statute to all residents equally, the Supreme Court upheld th!, statute under the equal pro-
tection clause on the basis of the state's offered rationales .• Jones v. Helms, 405 U.S. 977 
(1981). 
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Along with the right to travel, the right to vote is deemed fun-
damental for equal protection purposes. Because the franchise pro-
tects many other political and civil rights, the Supreme Court gen-
erally has imposed a strict scrutiny on impairments of this right. 8117 
During the survey period the Fifth Circuit has failed to overcome a 
self-confessed "initial perplexity"8118 in the so-called voting dilution 
cases.8119 Recent Supreme Court developments have left the court 
"adrift on uncharted seas with respect to how to proceed."880 As 
the survey period ended, the court was still dead-in-the-water.881 
The court considered several restrictions on candidacy during 
the survey period. The right to be a candidate is not itself funda-
mental. Candidacy regulations must still accord with general con-
stitutional protections such as due process and equal protection as 
well as with specific and fundamental individual rights such as the 
right to vote and the right to associate, which may be indirectly 
affected. In light of these multiple constitutional overlays, the 
Fifth Circuit has amalgamated a wide variety of alternative tests 
into one balancing test. The court performs a pragmatic bal811cing 
of the burdens on candidates and voters, the interests of the gov-
ernment, and the practicality that alternative means would satisfy 
the government interest more efficiently and with less encroach-
ment on individual interests.881 Applying this pragmatic approach 
during the survey period, the court upheld a state's requirement of 
a lluger number of signatures on an independent candidate's peti-
tion to be placed on a statewide ballot than was required from an 
independent candidate for president.888 A statewide requirement 
that candidates for sheriff have a high school diploma or its recog-
nized equivalent satisfied the balancing test as not unduly burden-
ing the candidate who had adequate opportunity to obtain a certif-
357. See Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
358. Corder v. Kirksey, 639 F.2d ll91, ll95 (5th Cir. 1981). 
359. Along with the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, the fifteenth 
amendment also protects against voting abridgement "on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
360. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 103 (1980) (White, J., dissenting). 
361. See generally Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1981) for an account of 
recent developments. See also Corder v. Kirksey, 639 F.2d ll91 (5th Cir. 1981); McMillan v. 
Escambia, 638 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1981). 
362. Woodward v. Deerfield Beach, 538 F.2d 1081, 1082 n.1 (5th Cir. 1976). 
363. Wilson v. Firestone, 623 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 984 
(1981). The same statute had been summarily approved in Beller v. Askew, 403 U.S. 925 
(1971). See also Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 
(1979). 
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. icate nor the ability of any cognizable group to seek office.864 In a 
third case the court turned away an equal protection broadside at-
tack on a state's election code governing election organization, 
nominating signatures, filing deadlines and write-in procedures be-
cause the court was convinced of the overall, genuine open quality 
of the system for candidates and voters alike.8611 In another case a 
candidate for office and several of his supporters alleged that the 
ballots were improperly counted and the candidate's opponent er-
roneously declared the winner. The court held that such an alleged 
local maladministration was not a violation of equal protection ab-
sent evidence of an intention to dilute the vote of the candidate's 
supporters or deprive the affected voters of their right to vote. 866 
In addition to classifications affecting individual rights, the 
equal protection guarantee also provides a constitutional measure 
for classifications which discriminate on the basis of group traits. 
During the survey period the Fifth Circuit decided noteworthy ap-
peals involving racial, alienage, and gender categories. 
Within the context of racial discrimination, no area of the law 
has generated· stronger feelings than desegregation of public 
schools. For its role in this effort the Fifth Circuit has been called 
the "greatest of all civil rights tribunals."867 During the survey pe-
riod the court's treatment of school desegregation issues was lim-
ited almost exclusively to consideration of remedies. 
The most noteworthy school desegregation decision during the 
survey period was Lee v. Lee County Board of Education.868 On 
appeal the court affirmed the district court's denial of the govern-
ment's motion for interdistrict relief. The utarting point for con-
sidering the appropriateness of an interdistrict remedy is the 
Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Milliken v. Bradley.869 The Su-
364. Goforth v. Poythress, 638 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1981). 
365. McCrary v. Poythress, 638 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Jenness v. Fortson, 
403 U.S. 431 (1971). 
366. Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1980). The court referred the plaintiffs 
to available state remedies. Id. at 454. 
367. Read, The Bloodless Revolution: The Role of the Fifth Circuit in the Integration 
of the Deep South, 32 MERCER L. REV. 1149 (1981). "The Fifth Circuit led the way in the 
doctrinal development of all of the major civil rights issues: jury selection, public accommo-
dations, voting rights and school desegregation. But it was in school desegretation that the 
problems were the most difficult and the opposition the most persistent." Id. at 1150-52. See 
generally F. READ & L. MCGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGIlATION OF THE 
DEEP SOUTH (1978). 
368. 639 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1981). 
369. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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preme Court in Milliken reviewed a comprehe,nsive plan involving 
fifty-four contiguous districts in order to desegregate the Detroit 
school district. The wide-reaching remedy was based on the dis-
trict court's pragmatic conclusion that an intradistrict remedy 
could not achieve desegregation and that although there was evi-
dence of de jure segregation only in the Detroit district, the. state 
legislature and the state board of education had contributed to the 
situation so the suburban districts, as part of the state system, 
could be brought in to remedy the problem. The Supreme Court 
reversed and held that a record establishing de jure segregation 
only in the city could not support a remedy extending beyond the 
city limits. A remedy in a school desegregation suit should only 
"restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they 
would have occupied in the absence of such conduct."87o The plain-
tiffs had not proven that the suburban districts had violated their 
rights nor that the Detroit district's segregative acts had harmed 
suburban students. The Supreme Court also rejected as too tenu-
ous the district court's agency and vicarious liability theories of 
statewide involvement. Finally, based on an expressed respect for 
the tradition of local control of education, the Supreme Court em-
phasized that the district lines matched jurisdictional limits and 
that there had been no showing of segregative line drawing. Milli-
ken established that for an interdistrict remedy to be valid there 
must be proof that "there has been a constitutional violation 
within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in 
another district."871 Specific proof that "racially discriminatory 
acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school dis-
trict have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation" 
would include a showing that the "racially discriminatory acts of 
one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adja-
cent district, or [that] ... district lines have been deliberately 
drawn on the basis of race."872 Applying this standard to Lee, the 
Fifth Circuit majority held that interdistrict relief was inappropri-
ate.873 After very carefully tracing the history of the three districts 
in the <;ounty, the court rejected the government's contention that 
they were effectively one school system. In terms of what the court 
called "areas ... essential to the autonomy of a school district," 
370. 639 F.2d at 1253 (quoting 418 U.S. at 746). 
371. 418 U.S. at 745. 
372. Id. at 744-45. 
373. Judge Tuttle agreed on the applicable standard but disagreed with the majority's 
conclusion that the facts did not satisfy it. 639 F.2d at 1271 (Tuttle, J., dissenting). 
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such as political authority, finances, curriculum and general ad-
ministration, the three districts had separate school boards, tax 
rates, curricula, faculty and administrators. The three were "bona 
fide, independent school districts," and thus Milliken controlled.S'14 
Responding to the government's contention that the Milliken test 
was satisfied by an interdistrict transfer pla:n used to maintain ra-
cial segregation, the court found no evidence that the transfer pro-
gram had a substantial direct and current segregative effect in per-
petuating a predominately one race school, which resulted from a 
demographic pattern which, in turn, was not necessarily the result 
of the. transfer rule.au Even the continued acceptance of transfers 
from the county districts to the city district was not considered to 
have the necessary significant, interdistrict segregative effect since 
only a handful of students were involved.878 Finally, the court held 
that subsequent annexations by the city of its own independent 
school district were not shown to have been a racially motivated 
redrawing of boundaries.877 . 
In a controversial decision the court considered the second . 
equal protection category of alienage and the rights of aliens. The 
court in Doe v. Plyler878 considered the application of a state stat-
ute denying free public education to children based on their status 
as undocumented Mexican aliens.879 Supreme Court precedent has 
made it clear that fourteenth a:mendment due process extends to 
legal and illegal aliens residing in the United States8SO and that the 
equal protection clause protects legal aliens residing in the coun-
try.8S1 The issue the court considered, for which there was no de-
374. [d. at 1256. 
375. See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd, 423 
U.S. 963 (1975). 
376. The majority disagreed with the dissent that a violation of the so-called Single-
ton· student-transfer rule included in a desegregation order would alone support an inter-
district remedy. Compare 639 F.2d at 1261-67 with id. at 1272. 
377. [d. at 1269. 
378. 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981). 
379. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.031(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981 provided: 
The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit into 
the public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who are either citizens 
of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over five and not over 21 
years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his parent, 
guardian or person having lawful control resides within the school district. 
380. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rei. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
381. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 
356 (1886). 
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finitive Supreme Court answer, was whether the equal protection 
clause extended to illegal aliens in this country. Preserving. the 
symmetry of the precedents, the court answered the question af-
firmatively.382 To reach this result, the court relied on Supreme 
Court dictum,383 and the logic of the fourteenth amendment. Since 
the due process clause applied to illegal aliens, the court saw no 
reason to conclude that the equal protection clause did not. The 
state could not muster a plausible argument in favor of a contrary 
result, and since a contrary result would be untenable, the court 
concluded that the fourteenth amendment meant what· it said. 
Having decided that illegal aliens were protected by the'equal pro-
tection clause, the court next considered what standard of review 
was applicable. While strict scrutiny would be required if the state 
were discriminating between aliens and others,38" the statute in' 
question made another discrimination. ,School-aged citizens and' 
lawful aliens were one group guaranteed public education, while 
everyone else, including illegal aliens, was in a second, group not 
guaranteed public education.3s11 The court concluded that "al-
though a statute that discriminates against some,but not all, legal 
aliens on the basis of some characteristics of alienage is subject to 
strict scrutiny, a statute that discriminates in favor of ~ll 'legal . 
aliens is not per se subject to [strict] judicial review."38s In any 
event, because the statue was deemed irrational, it failed the mini-
mal equal protection standard. 387 The state's contention that it was 
382. 628 F.2d at 454. Ct, Bolanos v. Kiley, 509 F,2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975). 
383. "The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the pro-
tection of citizens. It says: 'Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the law.' Those provisions are universal in their application to 
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of 
race, of color, or nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the 
protection of equal laws." Applying this reasoning to the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments, it must be concluded that all persons within the territory of the United States 
are entitled to the protection guaranteed by those amendments. 
628 F.2d at 455 (citations omitted) (quoting Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,238 
(1896), wherein was quoted Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886». . 
384. 628 F.2d at 457. The court emphasized the alienage classification aspect of equal 
protection after "declin[ing) to find that complete denial of free education to some children 
is not a denial of a fundamental right." [d. The Supreme Court recently has emphasized the 
importance of clearly defining the legislative categories. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 
221 (1981). 
385. Of course, the statutory exclusion of out of state residents would not violate the 
equal protection principle because the protection of the law went only so far as the jurisdic-
tion of the state. 628 F.2d at 457 n.24. 
386. [d. at 458 n.25. 
387. [d. at 458-61. 
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protecting against a devaluation of its citizens' and legal aliens' 
public education was not deemed sufficiently rational. "[A] state's 
desire to save money cannot be the basis of the total exclusion 
from public schools of a group of persons who are entitled to the 
equal protection of the laws of [the state] and who share similar 
characteristics with included children."388 As a parting observation 
the court recognized the acute problem facing border states caused 
by the failure to enforce national immigration laws but concluded 
that the Constitution required affirmance of the district court's in-
junction against following the statute. The Supreme Court has 
noted probable jurisdiction in this case, so the issues may soon be 
reconsidered.389 
During. the survey period the court considered three gender-
based equal protection cases. In re Crist390 involved the constitu'" 
tionaJity of section 17(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.391 The 
statute denied bankruptcy discharge "for alimony due to or be-
come due, or for maintenance or support of wife or child, or for 
seduction of an unmarried female or for breach of promise of mar-
riage accompanied by seduction, or for criminal conversation."3el 
On appeal it was argued that the gender-based discrimination 
passed constitutional muster as an attempt to alleviate "the dis-
parity in economic condition between men and women caused by 
the long history of discrimination against women. "393 The court re-
jected this as an insufficient blanket justification of a government 
compensation interest, which automatically presumed that a 
woman had suffered some compensable discrimination.3e• The 
court also declined to reinterpret the statute in a gender neutral 
way by defining the term "wife" as spouse.3911 Instead, the statute 
was analyzed under equal protection as written.39G Rather than de-
388. Id. at 459. The court rejected a distinction based on legal presence. Id. at 459-60. 
389. 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1980).· 
390. 632 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1980). 
391. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1976). This section was modified and replaced subsequent to 
the suit by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (Supp. III 1979). 
392. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1976). 
393. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977). See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 
498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). 
394. 632 F.2d at 1232. See Note, Alimony Awards Under Middle-Tier Equal Protec-
tion Scrutiny, 59 NEB. L. REV. 172 (1980). 
395. 632 F.2d at 1232-33. This path was made "legally impassable" by the Supreme 
Court interpretation in Westmore v. Markhoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904). 
396. This has been the Supreme Court approach as well. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 
U.S. 76 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 
U.S. 636 (1975). 
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claring the statute a nullity and thereby deny its benefits to males 
and females, the court followed the Supreme Court's lead and ex-
tended the benefit to everyone.397 While the statute as written pro-
vided females the benefit of nondischargeability of such debts 
owed by husbands, it did not do the same for those owed by wives. 
However, the equal protection clause required that the benefit be 
extended so that either a husband or a wife receiving· alimony or 
maintenance could assert the nondischargeability of the obligation. 
I 
In another gender-based appeal, Hester v. Harris,398 the court 
considered a presumption in the Social Security Act, namely that 
in a comnlUnity property state the income from a trade or business 
other than a partnership was the husband's income, unless the wife 
exercised substantially all of the management and control of the 
business.399 The husband thus was favored with the benefit of a 
statutory presumption that the business income was his, while the 
wife was burdened by having to rebut the presumption by showing 
she had exercised substantially all the control over the enterprise. 
The court deemed this an obvious violation of equal protection.40o 
Just as the standard for equal protection analysis of gender-
based discriminations has changed over the last decade, during the 
survey period the court learned that a particular plaintiff's gender 
may change as well, leading to a fact situation suggestive of law 
school hypotheticals. In Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & Latz, Inc.,·ol a 
prospective transsexual had been terminated from his job when, on 
his physician's orders, he refused to dress in accordance with his 
biological gender. She402 filed a suit after her sex reassignment pro-
cess had been completed. Of course, the gender-based discrimina-
tion test applies whether the classification discriminates against 
males or females.403 Kirkpatrick was claiming a discrimination 
against her as a male and female; she argued that she had been 
discriminated against as a transsexual woman. The court con-
cluded that since the plaintiff was still a male when he started 
397. 632 F.2d at 1234. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); 
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
398. 631 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1980). 
399. 42 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)(A) (1976). 
400.631 F.2d at 55-56. 
401. 636 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1981). Suit was under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976). 
402. On the question of gender-reference, see 636 F.2d at 1048 n.l. 
403. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
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wearing female clothing, her employer's refusal to allow the cross 
dressing at that time did not discriminate against her as a 
female. 404 
CONCLUSION 
It is important to note in closing that the constitutional deci-
sions of the courts of appeals will continue to increase in number 
and importance as the burgeoning federal caseload grows. The· 
scope and length of this article portrays the nearly impossible task 
confronting federal appellate courts. Faced with the reality that 
the court of appeals sits in most cases as both the appeal of right 
arid the final review, these judges are becoming, if not less fallible, 
at least more final in the constitutional domain.4011 As this trend 
continues distinct principles of federal constitutional law will be 
developed by these regional supreme courts. Their holdings will 
become more and more important. 
The significance of this development is highlighted in the pre-
sent· Symposium by a recent historic event in the history of our 
federal courts: the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization 
Act of 1980.406 The division of the Fifth Circuit into the new Fifth 
Circuit, composed of the District of the Canal Zone, Louisiana; 
Mississippi and Texas, and the new Eleventh Circuit, composed of 
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, raises many important questions 
for the new courts. Just how the precedents discussed here will 
fare in the two new courts is unclear.407 As the jurisprudential au-
~onomy of the courts of appeals increases, so do Congressional and 
judicial 'responsibilities involved in restructuring our federal 
courts .. 
404. 636 F.2d at 1049-50. The court did not reach the question whether transsexuals 
were a suspect class, for fourteenth amendment' purposes, because the complaint nowhere 
alleged a discrimination against transsexuals or plaintiff qua transsexual. Instead, the alle-
gations were that her employer would not allow her to dress like a woman when she was still 
a man. The plaintiff apparently made no claim of violation of constitutional right of privacy 
notion of personal autonomy. 
405. The paraphrase is borrowed from Mr. Justice Jackson's observation on the Su-
preme Court: "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because 
we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953). 
406. Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980). 
407. See generally Baker, note 277 supra. 
